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Introduction: Setting the Stage 
”It took a hundred years for us to even get to the point where we could start talking about and 
implementing a law to make sure everybody got health insurance. And my pledge to the American 
people is, is that we're going to solve the problems that are there, we're going to get it right, and 
the Affordable Care Act is going to work for the American people.” –President Barack Obama 
 
On March 23, 2010, President Barack Obama signed into law the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (the “Affordable Care Act,” or “ACA”), which has altered the health care 
landscape in the United States.  The implementation of the ACA has been a roller coaster: a 
Supreme Court decision, a government shutdown, and a continuing battle over whether it will 
lead to better health or disaster for this country.  The focal point of the ACA was increasing both 
the quality and affordability of health insurance for citizens or lawfully present people – a 
“coverage first” strategy for overarching health care reform.  The Act combined an individual 
mandate with subsidies to boost affordability, and included health insurance exchanges to foster 
coverage options.  Health insurance exchanges are marketplaces where individuals and 
businesses can shop for and buy health insurance (National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners, 2011, 1).  These marketplaces are web portals that consumers can visit to get 
informed and compare their insurance plan options.  Health plan options are checked and 
certified to comply with federal, and sometimes more stringent, state standards for coverage and 
price.  However, individuals do not have to purchase through the exchanges; the private 
insurance market remains as an option for buying coverage. 
 The health insurance exchanges are the vehicle driving the ACA reform – the front line 
and contact point to residents of the United States.  When the law was designed, federal 
policymakers incorrectly assumed that most states would create their own state-run health 
exchanges (Scotti, 2013).  In fact, more than half ended up using the option written within the 
	 5 
law that allowed them to have the federal government run and operate an exchange for their 
state.  A handful also ended up partnering with the federal government – leaving only seventeen 
states establishing their own design (“State Decisions For Creating Health Insurance 
Marketplaces,” 2014).  This decision alone vastly differentiated the implementation pathways of 
states, and resulted in tremendously different outcomes for residents depending on what state 
they live in.  The federal exchange, HealthCare.gov, had disastrous problems including an utter 
failure in its launch on October 1, 2013.  Many states have had technology breakdowns and 
abysmal enrollment numbers; such as Maryland who was still only accepting paper applications 
at the end of the first enrollment period, or Oklahoma whose enrollment percentage stands at 
4.5% of the eligible population after the first enrollment period (Speights, 2014).  By 
comparison, Connecticut’s percentage is approximately 30% (Speights, 2014).  Many states are 
struggling in a similar position to Oklahoma and Maryland, while others like Connecticut have 
soared and experienced relative success.  The question is, why? 
 
Argument 
 This thesis will focus on the implementation of a state-designed health insurance 
exchange in Connecticut, called Access Health CT.  The first round of enrollment for residents, 
which ran from October 1, 2013 until March 31, 2014, is now complete.  State and federal 
officials have publicly stated that Connecticut is a leader in ACA health insurance exchange 
implementation.  As of April 1, 2014, Access Health CT had signed up 208,301 people, or 
approximately 30% of its eligible population (Whipple, 2014).  By comparison, Hawaii’s state-
designed exchange enrolled just 3.2% of those eligible, and Oklahoma’s federally-facilitated 
exchange enrolled 4.5% (Speights, 2014).  Connecticut has also been praised for its functional 
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and fast technology and system, as well as a high satisfaction rate among enrollees (Whipple, 
2014).   
This thesis will argue that political focus on and support for health reform, as well as an 
existing health policy infrastructure within Connecticut, enabled the state to enjoy early success 
with ACA exchange implementation.  Political willingness backed by a network of advocates 
and experts drove Connecticut to the front of the pack and led to many smart structural design 
and implementation choices.  However, even a triumph in the first sprint does not mean a victory 
for the marathon that is the ACA’s implementation.  Connecticut still has to fix problems that 
have plagued its past efforts for health reform.  The two most prevalent issues include cost, with 
regards to health care services and affordability for consumers, as well as ensuring a solid health 
care system within the state to back up the large influx of newly insured individuals. 
 
Theoretical Background 
The ACA employs cooperative federalism: two levels of government, federal and state, 
working together to implement policy.  There is a particular set of literature that applies to policy 
implementation and federalism.  Numerous scholars have concurred that specific requirements, 
such as the willingness of each level to work together and structural capacity, are essential for 
implementation to succeed.  McLaughlin (1987) describes the difficulty of making policy 
changes happen, particularly across layers of government and multiple institutions (172).  He 
boils policy success down to two key ingredients: local capacity and will.  Capacity, he says, can 
be difficult, but it is possible to build over time (172).  Will, on the other hand, cannot be altered 
so easily and is a necessary foundation for successful policy change.  Particularly with a mandate 
from the federal government, policymakers cannot dictate what matters to a specific state (172).  
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Also recognized by scholars is the fluidity of implementation – the idea that implementation 
problems are never “solved,” (Majone and Wildavsky, 1977).  Implementation evolves through a 
multistaged, iterative process.  A balance of pressure and support on decision-makers from 
advocacy groups throughout the process is essential to focus and enable implementation. 
O’Toole and Montjoy (1984) build on this, adding that when two or more agencies or 
levels of government are coordinating to implement a policy, productive relations between the 
two are imperative, particularly when there is mandated cooperation (494).  This parallels 
Thompson’s (1986) argument that examines the commitment, capacity, and progressivity of 
states with regards to health care policy.  Thompson focuses on a gap of political will and 
administrative capacity between many states and Washington, D.C.  Years before the ACA was 
even passed, concerns were raised about having such substantial variation among the states with 
respect to their views on health care reform. 
The ACA challenges the federalist roots of the United States described by these policy 
implementation scholars.  The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) and the 
National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) can draft regulations and issue 
guidance for health reform, but the states have the power to truly make them work.  Jost (2010) 
predicted that the wide variety of choices would create unique exchange models within each 
state, allowing opportunities for experimentation, comparison, and learning (22).  That is 
precisely what has happened.  No state has made the exact same implementation decisions. 
With respect to health policy reform, a subsection of implementation scholars have 
suggested specific tactics and mechanisms to support state-level implementation.  Many have 
pointed to the importance of advocacy efforts within states.  While the depth and breadth of the 
advocacy community will inevitably differ from one state to another, developing the capacity of 
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existing state organizations has been identified as imperative for implementation success 
(McLaughlin, 1987).  Advocacy groups are seen to be important for tasks such as analyzing 
policy options, conducting legal analysis, building coalitions, developing communication efforts, 
monitoring, and providing feedback on implementation efforts (Dash, 2013, 8).  The California 
Endowment (2011) emphasizes the need for these advocacy groups to create a consumer 
implementation “table” that brings together organizations working on implementation, such as 
health care and low-income advocacy groups, state fiscal policy groups, and children advocacy 
organizations (5).  Also discussed is the need for relationships with the elected, appointed, and 
career state officials in order to have access to the leaders who are influential in driving 
implementation efforts.		As	the	implementation	literature	suggests,	political	will	and	capacity	in	the	form	of	advocacy	networks	proved	key	to	CT’s	successful	health	care	exchange. 
 
Methods 
When implementing the ACA, each state made choices that drove it closer or further 
from the ideal structures established by the scholars above.  Assessing these choices enables us 
to single out Connecticut and make conclusions as to how those choices have affected the level 
of success.  To do so, I conducted a complete overview of the health insurance exchange 
implementation literature.  This review led to a distinct group of principal decisions necessary 
for formulating an exchange.  To determine the breakdown of structural choices in Connecticut, I 
examined publications by multiple foundations and organizations within the state.  Further, I 
reviewed agendas, minutes and presentations from Exchange Board meetings.  To assess how 
these decisions were made and why, I interviewed seven key actors in Connecticut’s Exchange 
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implementation.  Drawing on connections from professors and relatives, I purposively identified 
initial informants across the range of key actors associated with health insurance exchanges.   
These key roles included consumer and small business advocates, officials working at the 
Exchange itself, a media representative, and an insurance policy analyst.  Additional informants 
were reached using a snowball procedure, where an informant would recommend a particular 
individual who he or she believed would be insightful.  Drawing on a semi-structured interview 
guide, interviews asked informants their opinion on certain decisions made by the Board, their 
own opinion on successes and failures of the Exchange, as well as a few specific questions 
related to their area of expertise.  Their answers were collected and organized to find patterns of 
opinions, as well as any contradicting viewpoints.  A few informants received follow-up emails 
to clarify their statements and probe their reasoning if their comments disagreed with something 
stated in another interview.  Interviews were also used to get a better perspective of the ground-
level implementation, including the unique nuances of Connecticut’s policy infrastructure that 
framed the choices that were made within the state. 
 
The Path Ahead 
 Using this strategy, I have pieced together an in-depth case study of Connecticut’s health 
insurance exchange implementation that reflects on the past and projects to the future.  The first 
chapter of this thesis will explore the past: a health reform that Massachusetts started in 2006 and 
was a model for the ACA.  The impact of comparable decisions made by Massachusetts’s 
policymakers shapes predictions of how implementation in Connecticut will play out.  While 
Massachusetts’s reform was a model for the ACA, it was not an exact replica.  Chapter two will 
outline the different options states had during the implementation of the ACA exchanges, and 
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will demonstrate the wide spectrum of alternatives.  These options are the forks, decisions where 
Connecticut branched off from other states’ decisions and paved their unique pathway of 
implementation.  Lastly, chapter three will focus on the specific pathway of Connecticut’s 
implementation, giving a detailed breakdown of the process.  Most importantly, I will draw 
conclusions as to whether Connecticut has truly succeeded in exchange implementation as the 
media has portrayed.  Success in Connecticut will be attributed to two overarching elements: a 
strong history of health reform that fostered a policy infrastructure and advocacy networks, 
coupled with political will.  It will become clear that these two factors facilitated a number of 
important structural choices made by Connecticut policymakers – the sequence of choices that 
has allowed Connecticut to be seen as one of the nation’s leaders in ACA implementation. 
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The 2006 Health Reform in Massachusetts:  
Takeaways From a State-Level Model for the ACA 
 
“A group of people across the state that is larger than the entire population of the city of Boston, 
which used to not have insurance, that group now has health insurance. It worked in 
Massachusetts.” – Jonathan Gruber, Professor of Economics at MIT  
 
Before health reform was a top priority on the national agenda, Massachusetts’s 
policymakers were designing their own comprehensive state reform in April of 2006.  The 
coverage and insurance market reform provisions of the ACA were modeled after those 
implemented in Massachusetts.  Because of its comparability to the ACA, the experiences of 
Massachusetts offer lessons, expectations, and possible consequences of certain provisions of the 
ACA.  Even when the ACA was first passed in March 2010, the Bay State already had four years 
of knowledge and experience with a similar law that policymakers continue to study to predict 
the ACA’s impacts. 
That said, the 2006 reform in Massachusetts was not identical to the ACA.  
Massachusetts has different demographics than other states where the ACA applies, and a few 
specifics, such as the insurance subsidies offered to low-income families, were different in its 
reform (Gruber, 2013, 185).  However, its basic structure can be used to gather a picture of what 
life might look like in the ACA’s future.  Considering Connecticut and Massachusetts’s 
similarities in political climate, population, and uninsured rates pre-reform, it is wise of 
Connecticut policymakers to pay close attention to outcomes in Massachusetts, and to hopefully 
learn valuable lessons from their successes and setbacks. 
This chapter will first report the structural and implementation choices made by 
Massachusetts’s legislators.  These will include decisions regarding decision-making bodies, the 
plans and subsidies established for consumers, and the actions taken to increase awareness and 
public support for the reform.  The efficacy of these decisions will be assessed based on whether 
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they successfully lowered the uninsured rate and increased access to health care, while 
minimizing negative concerns such as cost and long-term sustainability.  Most importantly, the 
applicable lessons from Massachusetts for Connecticut’s implementation of the ACA will be 
highlighted.  Perhaps most valuable will be exploring the changes that Massachusetts’s 
policymakers made once certain problems arose with implementation.  As a “learning 
organization,” the Massachusetts Exchange was able to use a cycle of feedback to make the 
changes needed to further its health care goals.  However, despite the success of some of these 
adaptations, cost and difficulties reaching the remaining uninsured population have continued to 
afflict the Massachusetts Exchange today.  The totality of initial snags, modifications made, as 
well as the lasting problems will all be necessary for Connecticut to understand if they are to 
successfully implement a health insurance exchange. 
 
An Act Providing Access to Affordable, Quality, Accountable Health Care 
Health reform was a top priority on the Massachusetts agenda back in 2006.  Many 
proposals were suggested and altered.  Although legislators disagreed on the specifics of how to 
reach their goals, most agreed on some basic objectives they wanted to achieve.  These included 
near-universal health insurance coverage, and improved access to affordable, high-quality health 
care that included shared responsibility between individuals, employers, and the government 
(Holahan and Blumberg 2006, 436).  All of these were predicted to be beneficial for improving 
the health status and overall welfare of state residents. 
Massachusetts’s legislation, like the ACA, set up a health insurance exchange for the 
purchase of non-group coverage, established a program to subsidize insurance for lower-income 
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families, and mandated that all adult residents purchase what is deemed affordable health 
insurance (Holtz-Eakin, 2011, 178).   
 
Policymaker Goals 
The overarching, long-term goal for the Massachusetts health reform improved health 
care for its citizens.  However, to do so, the state set objectives specifically to measure success of 
the Act’s implementation.  First and foremost, Massachusetts aimed to reduce the rate of 
uninsured people in the state to achieve the goal of near-universal coverage.  But in order to link 
increased coverage with further extended health care success, other goals had to be addressed as 
well.  The second goal was to improve access to affordable, high-quality health care.  Improved 
access could be demonstrated in the average number of doctor visits and resident-reported 
satisfaction levels.  High quality could also be a self-reported satisfaction level and perhaps the 
number of specialty care visits.  Finally, policymakers also wanted to ensure a sense of shared 
responsibility between individuals, employers, and the government.   
Massachusetts’s policymakers knew that focusing so much effort on getting people health 
insurance was not going to be possible forever.  In fact, they knew that this was just the first step 
in improving overall health care for residents.  They made the decision to channel a lot of energy 
into getting people health insurance, and determined they would make adjustments later.  To do 
so, the Exchange defined itself as a “learning organization,” where they constantly reconsidered 
and revised their policies based on the experience of consumers, carriers, and employers 
(Kingsdale, 2009, 592).  This feedback mechanism would address health care problems as they 
arose throughout the reform. 
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Structure and Implementation Decisions 
The health insurance exchange for the state was named the Commonwealth Health 
Insurance Connector, or “the Connector.”  This was established as a quasi-independent state 
agency with ten senior staff members and approximately fifty employees (Lischko, Bachman & 
Vangeli, 2009, 2).  An eleven-member Board of Directors governed the Connector.  The Board 
included representatives from business, labor and consumer backgrounds, as well as content 
experts (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2012, 2).  The Board and the Connector worked together on 
determining the interworking of the marketplace.  For example, the Board set the minimum 
creditable coverage (MCC) standards, mandated an individual mandate, and defined an 
“affordable premium,” (McDonough et al., 2008).  However, the Connector defined the 
boundaries of that mandate and decided the precise numbers and insurance plans that would fit 
the outlines decided by the Board.  Many decisions were a cooperative effort between the two.  
The Connector also approved the sliding scales of subsidized health coverage provided by the 
state, as well as non-subsidized insurance that meets certain coverage and cost standards 
(Kingsdale, 2009, 591).  Basically, the Connector has the power to decide what category of 
insurance residents fall into, and how much each of those categories will pay.   
Another job of the Connector was making sure awareness and public support were 
widespread.  Enrollment in the subsidized and non-subsidized programs required an “active 
response” by residents.  If the uninsured were confused about coverage or too anxious about the 
financial commitment, the policy was not going to succeed (SOURCE? 590).  In addition to 
residents, employer-backing is consistently a huge issue for health reforms.  In Massachusetts, 
business groups had blocked prior legislation, so it was imperative that they “buy in” to the rules 
of the new policy. 
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To do so, Massachusetts’s legislators and policymakers ran a campaign.  The process 
included many public events.  The law was signed in historic Faneuil Hall, with political leaders, 
advocacy groups, business executives and the public all in attendance (SOURCE? 590).  Other 
milestone celebrations were held at the State House, community health centers, the Kennedy 
Presidential Library, Harvard University, and the University of Massachusetts.  Even the Boston 
Red Sox baseball team was on board, with events held at Fenway Park (Raymond, 2011, 15).  
Publicity created by these events was also important when spreading the word for a new 
coverage option launch. 
 The state also funded community outreach efforts, a public information office, hundreds 
of educational meetings, and advertising (Kingsdale, 2009, 590).  Legislators made sure their 
communities knew about the program.  Politicians used radio, television, social media, signs at 
grocery stores, fliers at the Department of Motor Vehicles, postcards, and even ads on subways 
and busses (Raymond, 2011, 15).  Not only did they make sure residents were aware, but they 
were constantly reaching out for suggestions and educating citizens about their options.  This 
engagement was used to justify the burdens of shared responsibility and make sure the 
population was informed.  Although what individuals, employers, and the government were 
taking on with this reform may have seemed daunting, the idea that it was a collective effort 
lessened this load.  This collective spirit was reflected in this statistics of public support: more 
than two-thirds of likely voters supported the legislation even a few years after the reform was 
initiated (Kingsdale, 2009, 591). 
 
Evaluation of Outcomes: What Went Right 
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 When evaluating the outcomes of the Massachusetts health reform, we seek to compare 
the results under reform to the results that would have occurred in the absence of reform.  
Fortunately, many foundations sponsored research that provided baseline data on coverage, 
access to needed care, racial and ethnic disparities, as well as the effect of the health reform on 
the state’s population over time.  All of this information and data is key for determining the 
success of implementation. 
 An overwhelming majority of sources share common statistics and determinations 
regarding the health reform in Massachusetts.  Long (2008) conducted a survey of 10,000 
respondents over a 3-year time period (272).  The surveys collected information on insurance 
status, access to care, out-of-pocket spending, medical debt, and more general financial 
problems.  The report compares outcomes for a cross-sectional sample of adults in periods 
following the implementation of health reform to the outcomes for a similar cross-sectional 
sample of adults prior to the reform (Long and Masi, 2009, 579).   
 In terms of lowering the uninsured rate the data shows that after implementation of the 
2006 health reform, uninsurance is at historically low levels.  These findings were again verified 
by annual studies; in 2011, the uninsurance rate in Massachusetts was 3.9 percent, while the 
national average was 15.1 percent (Long, Goin, and Lynch, 2013, 2).  
 With respect to the goal of increasing access to health care, there have been 
improvements in access for working-age adults.  Adults are more likely to have a primary source 
of care, doctor visits, preventative care visits, and dental care visits than before the reform.  
Working-age adults were more likely to report that they had a usual place to go when sick or in 
need of advice about their health, which indicates a continuity of care in the system (Long and 
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Masi, 2009, 580).  All of these positive gains reflect increases in both insurance coverage and in 
the enhancements of existing coverage. 
 Another goal established by policymakers was to ensure shared responsibility between 
individuals, employers, and the government.  This was achieved when many implementers 
focused on strong coordination between all levels, from policymakers to ground-level workers.  
For example, the Secretary of Health and Human Services held weekly meetings with leaders 
across the state to share information and report progress and challenges (Raymond, 2011, 8).  
This communication led to an effective collaboration between multiple agencies working on the 
policy.  Legislators were sure to start the program with mostly existing programs to maintain 
continuity during initial implementation.  The Health and Human Services Department in 
Massachusetts worked with the Connector on joint training sessions, and the Connector also 
worked with the Division of Insurance to design certain policies(SOURCE 8).  This coordination 
was so important because it reduced redundancy and administrative costs.  Coordination also 
contributed to a smoother transition for people switching to a different type of coverage.  Other 
strategic decisions were designing a common application and placing people automatically in the 
program they qualify for (10).  This alleviated the need for residents to understand any 
unnecessary, complicated details. 
 While Massachusetts exceled in furthering its health care goals, not every aspect of the 
proposal worked smoothly from the beginning.  As expected when the state defined itself as a 
“learning organization,” the Connector had to tweak its plan a bit for the reform to reach its full 
potential. 
 
Evaluation of Outcomes: What Needed to Be Fixed 
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 With all of these successes, any policymaker has to keep sustainability in mind.  For the 
Massachusetts health reform, there were some difficulties.  For example, there were indications 
that some adults were having a more difficult time obtaining care in the fall of 2008 than in fall 
of 2007.  Although this may reflect many factors, its likely that the influx of newly insured adults 
combined with those now having additionally covered benefits created an increased demand for 
follow-up care that was not anticipated or prepared for by the medical providers (Kaiser Family 
Foundation, 2012, 5). 
 Another issue was the fact that one in five adults reported being told the doctor’s office 
was not accepting patients with their type of coverage or was not accepting any new patients 
(Andrews, 2014).  These difficulties were more common for lower-income individuals with 
public coverage than for higher-income adults with private insurance.  This could be the result of 
lower reimbursements to providers from public versus the private programs. 
 Risk selection and free riding has been difficult for Massachusetts because of the 
“coverage first” strategy – similar to the ACA.  Generally speaking, people are incentivized to 
take on coverage when they have expensive medical care costs, then drop coverage after 
treatment.  Big picture, this means insurance companies are taking on costs for all these costly 
procedures, but there are not enough healthy people to balance out the costs of paying for that 
treatment.  A study by the main insurance provider for the Connector, Blue Cross Blue Shield, 
demonstrated that there was a large portion of the population that would sign up for coverage for 
three months or less, undertake medical spending four times the average, then drop coverage 
soon after (Holtz-Eakin, 2011, 179). 
 Affordability is another significant concern for policymakers.  Per capita health spending 
in the state is 15% higher than the national average (Kingsdale, 2009, 589).  During the first year 
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of reform, the financial burden of health care on individuals dropped significantly.  But slowly 
the gains trailed off.  This led to increases in unmet need for care because of costs over that 
period.  There was also difficulty finding providers and getting timely appointments (Long and 
Masi, 2009, 585).  Thus, the growing health care costs were jeopardizing affordability and 
affecting the successes of the entire health reform. 
 
Addressing The Issues: Response by Legislators & Policymakers 
The strong communication channels opened by policymakers enabled them to be fully 
aware of the problems discussed above.  As a “learning organization,” the Connector took a 
number of initiatives to address these issues.  The structural set-up of the reform allowed for a 
constant evolution of policy. 
For example, to increase provider capacity, they started primary care physician 
recruitment programs.  These expanded medical school enrollments for students committed to 
primary care, and even started a program that repaid loans for medical students who agreed to 
practice in underserved areas (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2012, 6).  When applications were 
coming in too fast for workers to process them, the Connector adopted enrollment simplifications 
and made greater use of technology (Raymond, 2011, 12).  Additional health reform legislation 
was also passed in 2008 to initiate cost containment and delivery system improvements.  It 
included new regulations for electronic medical records by 2015 and a uniform billing and 
coding procedure among health care providers and insurers (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2012, 7).  
Furthermore, legislators have noticed other issues and enacted solutions; they have banned gifts 
to physicians from pharmaceutical companies and implemented a program that educates 
providers on the cost-effective utilization of prescription drugs (7).  Taking this a step further, 
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providers are encouraged to investigate cost themselves and make recommendations to reduce 
excess expenses during annual public hearings. 
 Sticking with the strategy of listening to the front line, the legislature also created a 
Special Commission on the Health Care Payment System.  This Commission released 
recommendations in 2009 suggesting a transparent payment methodology that made significant 
changes to the system (7).  New legislation was passed based on these recommendations, and 
introduced in May of 2012.  All of these adaptions prove that the policy and structure in place for 
the health reform in Massachusetts was flexible in a way that made successful implementation a 
much more likely outcome.   
When legislators in Massachusetts made the decisions to start with an individual mandate 
and focus on universal coverage, they knew that this would mean adjustments.  The Connector’s 
persistent acknowledgment of areas for improvement has been a significant reason for its 
success.  But no matter how successful a policy, it cannot be perfect.  This next section will 
address long-term problems that the Connector has faced, despite changes made by legislators.    
 
Remaining Issues: Long-Term Problems Connecticut Should Understand 
Massachusetts has been heavily criticized during the more recent implementation of the 
ACA due to its “largely non-functional exchange website” (Archambault, 2014).  This website, 
however, is completely different from the website used for the original 2006 health reform due to 
certain requirements from the federal government.  These changes include incorporating an 
exchange for small businesses, connecting technology to federal databases, and adjusting 
subsidies and plan designs to ensure they are conforming to federal standards (Gruber, 2013, 
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185).  Setting aside the well-known struggle with technology, there are also a few long-term 
problems of the Connector that Connecticut should  actively try to combat. 
 
Cost Containment 
The cost of health care in Massachusetts was the highest in the country before reform law 
was passed – and remains so as of 2013 (Vestal, 2013).  The Connector emphasized that its main 
focus in the original phases of implementation would be on lowering the uninsured rate.  Rising 
costs quickly became an apparent problem that needed to be addressed.  Cost of health care is a 
double-edged sword: (a) prices of services are rising, which means (b) corresponding premiums 
and deductibles paid by consumers are raised accordingly.  Many people in the Massachusetts 
health care industry are worried that this “death spiral” will unravel the state’s nearly universal 
health care coverage, bankrupt businesses, and have severely detrimental effects on the state’s 
budget (Vestal, 2013). 
Rising health care costs are not unique to Massachusetts.  While they are proportionally 
higher in the Bay State, nationwide health care costs per person are higher in the United States 
than in any other country in the world (Holtz-Eakin et al., 2011, 180).  In August 2013, 
Massachusetts passed Chapter 224 designating a budget for the health care industry in the 
Commonwealth.  The central idea behind the law is price transparency – to require all of the 
state’s insurers and health care providers to provide to the public the prices of the services they 
offer (Vestal, 2013).  The hope is that this will arm consumers to make informed choices about 
their care, forcing providers to respond to this competitive pressure by offering cheaper services.  
Quality, however, is thought to be controlled by consumer pressure; therefore providers would 
have incentives to deliver less expensive care by becoming more efficient (Vestal, 2013).  
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Governor Deval Patrick said of the law, “I’m confident that just as we showed the nation how to 
deliver universal care, Massachusetts will be the place that cracks the code on cost containment,” 
(Vestal, 2013). 
 The effects of Chapter 224 will not be seen for many years.  Cost of health care will 
continue to be a battle for Massachusetts.  Skeptics of the new law question its enforceability.  If 
the industry does not limit annual growth to the state’s designated regulations, will providers be 
issued penalties; will they be shut down?  Many worry that providers are not working with a 
margin that is attainable for them to contain, therefore the law will “have no teeth” when it 
comes to enforcement (Vestal, 2013). 
 
Reaching the Remaining Uninsured Population 
In addition to cost containment, similar issues continue with reaching the remaining 
uninsured population.  According to the Urban Institute and Kaiser Commission on Medicaid, 
the average state health uninsurance rate is 15%.  The highest uninsured rate is Nevada at 23%.  
The lowest is Massachusetts, where only 4% of the population remains without health insurance 
(Kaiser Commission on Medicaid 2013).  However, this means that some residents of the state 
continue to go without health insurance coverage.  These remaining uninsured are 
disproportionately younger, male, Hispanic, and non-citizens (Long, Goin, and Lynch, 2013, 1).  
The $20 million statewide outreach and awareness campaign discussed was not successful in 
signing up this portion of the population.  As seen in Figure 1, the relatively high uninsurance for 
non-elderly adults (8 percent or more) in the state in 2010 was concentrated in the Greater 
Boston area and in pockets across the state, including areas around Lowell and Springfield and in 
the southeastern part of the state. 
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Figure 1: Uninsurance Rates for Non-Elderly Adults and Children Across Communities in 
Massachusetts, 2010 
Source: Blue Cross Blue Shield 2013, page 25 
 
Not all of those uninsured are eligible for coverage options, particularly due to new 
provisions implemented from the ACA.  Undocumented immigrants are ineligible for Medicaid.  
Literacy, language and culture issues among the uninsured also were not addressed satisfactorily.  
Maxwell et al. (2011) corroborates that Hispanics are more likely than any other racial or ethnic 
group in the United States to lack health insurance.  New outreach strategies are being employed 
to target the communities with the largest numbers of uninsured individuals, especially those 
lacking connections to the health care system.  Additional changes include simplified enrollment 
processes and extended assistance for finding providers within the health care system (Maxwell 
et al., 2011).  The lesson to be learned from Massachusetts in this area is that in initial outreach 
efforts, the younger, male, Hispanic populations will be more difficult to inform. 
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Concluding Remarks 
The Massachusetts health reform has provided us with a valuable example of what ACA 
implementation might be like.  This chapter outlined the pathway that Massachusetts took and 
drew out both successes and failures.  Having this model to analyze can be beneficial to 
Connecticut – both to replicate the Commonwealth’s successes and to avoid its mistakes. 
 As would be expected from a state-initiated reform, it has been clear throughout this 
chapter that political support in Massachusetts was imperative to its success.  Proper funding and 
manpower to carry out implementation efforts such as outreach and plan design was crucial.  
Clear goals, a varied group of knowledgeable representatives on the Board, and cooperation 
between involved agencies also helped Massachusetts succeed in moving towards universal 
health insurance coverage.  These decisions made possible a commendable outreach campaign 
that has successfully signed up enough citizens that Massachusetts now has the lowest uninsured 
rate of any state.  Research has shown that this coverage has opened the door for many residents 
of Massachusetts, allowing them access to health care that was unattainable before the reform. 
 Additionally, a significant quality of the exchange in Massachusetts was its own 
definition of itself as a “learning organization.” Policymakers and legislators have consistently 
been open to making modifications based on funneled feedback from ground-level workers, 
consumers, and researchers.  A perfect example of this was mentioned when the shortage of 
providers problem started.  The learning organization heard the struggles and made a number of 
changes to combat them, even starting a program that repaid loans for medical students who 
agreed to practice in underserved areas.  This cyclical reform process supported the 
Massachusetts reform and has been a large component of its continued success. 
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 In conjunction with these positive takeaways, Massachusetts has also illustrated a few 
long-term problems of concern.  This chapter has demonstrated that both the containment of 
health care costs and bringing in the hardest to reach uninsured populations have been difficult 
for Massachusetts.  These are issues that all those implementing exchanges through the ACA 
should be aware of so they can actively attempt to combat these problems.   																					 	
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ACA Pathways: Structural and Implementation Options for States 
 
“States must make complex decisions about how to design their exchanges in ways that reflect the 
unique needs of their consumers and insurance market. [These decisions] affect key outcomes, 
such as enrollment, cost, consumer experience, and sustainability.”  – Sarah Dash, Kevin W. 
Lucia, Katie Keith, and Christine Monahan, Georgetown University 
 
The ACA directs states to establish health insurance marketplaces, or exchanges, to 
facilitate purchasing by both individuals and employers.  In contrast to the Act’s other provisions 
such as broader reforms for the private insurance market and Medicaid expansion, the 
implementation of the exchanges rests heavily on the efforts of the states.  Similar to 
Massachusetts in its 2006 health reform, states have made decisions regarding structure, 
governance, operations, and how to ensure a seamless, quality experience for their future 
consumers – citizens.  This chapter will outline the different options states faced when 
implementing exchanges.  Since no two states followed the exact same pathway, each can be 
seen as its own “state experiment” of the ACA.  Although in-depth comparisons between states 
regarding these decisions will take years and numerous rounds of data collection, it is important 
to outline the differences now to formulate predictions regarding what decisions are principal to 
success. 
 
The Big One: What Type of Exchange 
The first decision states made shaped the entirety of their ACA implementation.  Their 
options were (a) to design their own state exchange, (b) to partner with the federal 
government or (c) to defer to the federal government to set up an exchange for them. 
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 The ACA passed through Congress without a single vote from a Republican 
representative.  For most of its provisions, the lack of Republican support was immaterial 
because the new policies were to be implemented nationwide.  For the exchanges, however, the 
lack of Republican support caused problems.  The bill that ended up passing through Congress 
required states to “opt-in” to exchanges.  This “opt-in” meant administering the law themselves, 
and the alternative was turning responsibility over to the federal government.  To design their 
own exchanges, states had to put in active effort that indicated the state was making progress on 
implementation.  States with political environments opposed to the ACA typically did not take 
action to show compliance with a law they did not want to pass in the first place.  But this 
inaction meant they deferred to a federally-facilitated exchange that the Secretary of the 
Department of Health and Human Services would set up for them.   
 Twenty-seven states defaulted to the federally operated exchange option as an intentional 
snub to the Act, while others did not feel they had the capacity to operate an exchange 
themselves.  In Texas, Governor Rick Perry, a Republican, announced that Texas would not 
create a state exchange because it would not result in better “patient protection” or in more 
“affordable care” (ThinkProgress, 2012).  As a result, Texas is served by the federal government 
exchange.  In Maine, public officials made the decision that they could not establish their own 
exchange due to fiscal constraints of the state.  Thus, they too relied heavily on the federal 
government to set up their exchange.  However, unlike Texas, Maine’s proposal letter to the 
Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services stated, “the State of Maine is open to exploring 
options for coordination as described in your proposal” (State of Maine Bureau of Insurance, 
2013).  An additional seven states opted for a Partnership exchange, a hybrid model where the 
state and federal governments work together.   
	 28 
The remaining sixteen states, and the District of Columbia, chose to establish an 
Exchange themselves (CCIIO, 2013).  Requesting permission from the Secretary of the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services to establish a state-run exchange was a bit like 
applying to college.  In Connecticut, Governor Dannel Malloy sent a letter to Secretary Kathleen 
Sebelius on July 10, 2012.  The deadline for submission was December 14, 2012.  Governor 
Malloy had to update Sebelius on the CT Exchange: what the structure, board and plans were for 
the future.  The Governor’s letter ended with, “On behalf of everyone involved in the Exchange, 
we look forward to working with your office to realize the goals of the ACA and to develop an 
Exchange by 2014 that meets the unique market and coverage needs here in Connecticut” 
(Malloy, 2012).  The CT Exchange workers received a response from Secretary Sebelius on 
December 7, 2012.  She congratulated Governor Malloy and informed him that the state had 
received conditional approval to establish a state-based exchange.  These conditions included 
being able to perform all required Exchange activities projected in the CT Exchange Blueprint 
Application, and ongoing compliance with future guidance and regulations (Sebelius, 2012). 
 With this major milestone out of the way, a whole slew of other decisions came to the 
forefront.  States all over the country were granted permission to continue working on their 
exchanges, and hastily went to work in order to meet the deadlines assigned by Secretary 
Sebelius. 
 
Organizational Form 
States created structural designs for their exchanges to specify the exchange’s relationship 
with the government. 
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For the states that decided to establish their own exchanges, they had a few structural 
options: assign the tasks of the Exchange to an existing state office, establish a new independent 
entity, or create a nonprofit entity (NAIC, 2011, 3).  There are benefits and drawbacks to each of 
these choices.  In particular, there is an important trade-off to weigh when selecting a structure: 
accountability versus flexibility.  A state agency would have high accountability because it is 
made up of elected officials that have to adhere to public scrutiny and retain the threat of not 
being re-elected.  However, there is a trade-off because this agency would also have less 
flexibility due to state administrative and government operation laws.  Something as small as the 
maximum salary for a civil service job might not be a huge deal until policymakers are trying to 
recruit the best talent for the Exchange and the best candidate will not accept such low pay.  The 
flip side may have more flexibility, but would not have the accountability, mandated 
transparency and public participation that a government agency would.  A more technical issue 
of an Exchange is related to funding.  State agencies are subject to political and economic cycles, 
which might affect their stability.  These nuances had to be considered by states when weighing 
the placement of an exchange.  These trade-offs are described in the table below. 
 
Table 1: Advantages and Disadvantages of Exchange Structure Types 
Type Advantages Disadvantages 
State Agency 
• Direct link to State 
administration 
• Potentially easier 
coordination with other State 
agencies 
• More accountability to actors 
involved 
• Streamlining 
• Politicized decision-making 
• Budgetary issues 
• Bureaucratic hoops to jump through 
• Difficulty hiring and contracting 
practices due to procurement rules 
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Independent 
Public Entity 
• Possible exemption from 
State personnel and 
procurement laws 
• More independence from 
existing State agencies 
• Difficult coordinating with key State 
agencies (i.e. state Medicaid, insurance 
department, etc.) 
• Expenses to establish new entity 
• Confusion over responsibilities 
 
Non-Profit 
Entity 
• Flexibility in decision-
making 
• Less likely for decisions to be 
politicized. 
• Isolation from State policymakers and 
key State agency staff 
• Potential for decreased accountability  
• Potential for regulatory duplication, 
conflict and confusion. 
• Expenses to establish new entity 
 
 Having weighed these options, states set off on different trajectories in terms of the 
structures of their exchanges.  Hawaii and Idaho opted to set-up their exchanges as non-profits.  
This decision has given the implementers a relaxed reign for making decisions.  In Hawaii, 
however, some opponents of the non-profit structure have stated that its exemption from the 
state’s open meetings law has been detrimental to the transparency and accountability of the 
exchange (McCambridge, 2012).  Kentucky, New York, Rhode Island, Utah and Vermont have 
exchanges running within state agencies.  In New York, the Exchange is within the Department 
of Health and has authority to work in conjunction with the Department of Financial Services to 
carry out its responsibilities (Kaiser Family Foundation New York State Marketplace Profile, 
2013). 
 Connecticut was one of twelve states that created a quasi-governmental organization for 
its exchange: the Office of Health Reform & Innovation.  Lieutenant Governor Nancy Wyman 
headed the statewide approach to federal health reform, and she directed the SustiNet Health 
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Care Cabinet to advise the Governor and the Office on issues related to the ACA implementation 
(NCSL, 2013).  She said of the appointed 14 members of the Board, “We have assembled a wide 
variety of experts who I am confident will achieve the goals of the Exchange - expanding access 
to affordable, high quality health care coverage while reducing costs.”   She explained that as a 
quasi-public, the exchange would ensure transparency and accountability while still being nimble 
enough to move swiftly like a private-sector company (Stewartson, 2011). 
After the first board meeting was delayed in the aftermath of Hurricane Irene, the Cabinet 
first met on September 12, 2011 to discuss the role of the office (Connecticut Health Reform 
Central, 2011).  They established that in order to provide a meaningful and proactive statewide 
approach to federal health reform, they needed to establish partnerships, facilitate action plans, 
and provide expertise, while respecting the sovereignty of other agencies and partners.  Each 
cabinet member was assigned a work group in the first meeting – everything from health 
technology to business plan development.  Connecticut had chosen a structure and officially 
started implementation efforts. 
 
Board Composition 
States also had to determine who they wanted to be a part of their exchange’s Board – in 
other words, who would be best to govern this new body? 
 
The composition of the board is imperative, as these individuals will be determining 
policy, voting on the issues, and driving the force of implementation.  Among advocates of 
health reform, board diversity is seen as essential to achieving good governance and efficiency 
(Jost, 2010, 7).  A variety of interests, fields of expertise, and political perspectives are 
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beneficial.  This could mean representatives of other state agencies that the board interacts with 
(insurance division, Medicaid agency, etc.); consumers, especially representatives from lower-
income and minority communities; and small businesses.   
Although insurers, producers, and providers should be represented, this should be 
achieved by avoiding specific conflicts of interest.  Health insurers, brokers who sell health 
insurance products, and health care providers should be barred from receiving unfair advantages 
over competitors or swaying policy decisions to aid their own side concerns (NAIC, 2011, 5).  
Avoidance could mean enacting legislation or provisions that would, for instance, prohibit 
exchange board members from currently working at or moving directly to or from the insurance 
industry (4).  This is a delicate balance to achieve; the board must get the politics right and 
remain fair, but also ensure that the exchange succeeds and that they are capable of 
understanding every aspect of necessary implementation action.  Generally, the goal should be a 
group of people who can work together to run an exchange, be impartial, and remain committed 
to efficient and professional management. 
State-run exchange boards range from five to nineteen members.  In Maryland, 
legislation defines that a seven-member board will govern their Exchange.  The Governor 
appoints six of those members with the advice and consent of the Senate and House of 
Representatives.  The last member is ex officio, the Commissioner of Human Services.  There 
are also rules dictating what groups must be represented on the Board, and limitations on 
affiliations of members (Kaiser Family Foundation Connecticut Marketplace Profile, 2013).   
The Connecticut board consists of fourteen individuals, including six ex-officio members, 
or members that are part of the Board due to their position in another office (such as Benjamin 
Barnes from the Office of Policy and Management).  On the board are many experts – such as 
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Dr. Robert Scalettar in health care delivery systems, and Dr. Robert Tessier, in health care 
benefits plan administration (Wyman, 2011).  There are two non-voting members, and eight of 
the twelve voting members are appointed by elected officials.  Table two presents the current 
members of the Exchange Board. 
 
Table 2: The Board of Directors of Connecticut’s Health Insurance Exchange as of March 2013 
Name Position Type 
Nancy Wyman – 
Chair Lieutenant Governor Governor's Appointee 
Mary Fox Retired Senior VP of Aetna Product Group Governor's Appointee 
Paul Philpott Principal Consultant, Quo Vadis Advisors LLC 
Legislative Leadership 
Appointee 
Grant A. Ritter Senior Scientist, Schneider Institutes for Health Policy 
Legislative Leadership 
Appointee 
Robert E. Scalettar Former Chief Medical Officer, Anthem Blue Cross Blue Shield  
Legislative Leadership 
Appointee 
Robert F. Tessier Executive Director, CT Coalition of Taft-Hartley Health Funds 
Legislative Leadership 
Appointee 
Cecilia J. Woods Former Vice-Chair, Permanent Commission on the Status of Women 
Legislative Leadership 
Appointee 
Maura Carley President and CEO, Healthcare Navigation, LLC 
Legislative Leadership 
Appointee 
Roderick L. Bremby Commissioner, Department of Social Services Ex-Officio Member (Voting) 
Vicki Veltri - Co-
Chair 
State Healthcare Advocate, Office of 
the Healthcare Advocate Ex-Officio Member (Voting) 
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Benjamin Barnes Secretary, Office of Policy & Management Ex-Officio Member (Voting) 
Anne Melissa 
Dowling  
Deputy Commissioner, Connecticut 
Insurance Department 
Ex-Officio Member (Non-
Voting) 
Jewel Mullen Commissioner, Department of Public Health 
Ex-Officio Member (Non-
Voting) 
Patricia Rehmer, 
MSN 
Commissioner, Department of 
Mental Health and Addiction 
Services 
Ex-Officio Member (Non-
Voting) 
Source: Connecticut Health Reform Central 2013 
 
 
Connecticut decided that Board members cannot have affiliations with insurers, insurance 
producer or brokers, or associations of health care providers, health care facilities or clinics, or 
related trades for these entities while serving on the Board.  Board Members are also prohibited 
from working for a health care carrier that offers a plan through the Exchange for a year after 
serving on the Board (Kaiser Family Foundation Connecticut Marketplace Profile, 2013). 
Despite these provisions, the Board has a substantial representation of members with ties to the 
insurance industry. 
Some consumer groups are concerned about the absence of representation for 
underinsured or uninsured consumers in Connecticut’s Exchange.  In fact, Small Businesses for a 
Healthy Connecticut pushed for the removal of retired health insurance executives from the 
Board and pushed for more representation of consumers and small businesses.  Small Businesses 
for a Healthy Connecticut sent a letter to Secretary Sebelius asking for her help "in addressing 
the problematic composition of Connecticut's Health Insurance Exchange Board which has over-
representation by insurance industry interests and under-representation by individual and small 
business consumers" (Bordonaro, 2012).  Consumer advocates particularly took issue with the 
appointment of insurance executive Mary Fox (former senior VP for Aetna Product Group).  
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Others, however, disagree and insist the appointments were given to people with real expertise 
and “demonstrated concern about and sensitivity to consumer issues and to the needs and desires 
of purchasers” (Bordonaro, 2012).  Nevertheless, barring any immediate changes to the make-up 
of the board, the group that will have the most influence over how Connecticut’s Exchange will 
operate is in place. 
 
Regulatory Authority of the Marketplace 
Once the board is in place, it must make crucial regulatory decisions about the 
functioning of the state health marketplace.  The Board has final say on all decisions – 
everything from choosing to put a limit on the health plans allowed to be sold through the 
exchange, to whether to merge the individual and small employer health insurance markets.  
Each state designing its own exchange made its own choices regarding aspects of regulatory 
authority of the marketplaces.  Two important regulatory considerations when working with 
health insurance are adverse selection and the design of certified qualified health plans. 
 
I.  Adverse Selection 
State exchanges have to face the threat of adverse selection.  This phenomenon is when 
individuals purchasing insurance through an exchange are categorically unhealthier and incur 
high health care costs (Jost, 2010, 3).  For example, in Connecticut, the Exchange creates a 
market for health insurance and allows people to sign up for certain health insurance plans.  
However, there is still the option of purchasing an insurance plan through a company that is not 
sold on an exchange.  These two groups of people signing up for insurance are called “pools.” 
Adverse selection is a potential problem because the pool of people purchasing insurance 
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through an exchange can essentially become a “high-risk” pool that becomes destructive to 
insurers (SOURCE 3).  This natural selection is destructive because if many new customers 
buying through an exchange have high medical bills (“high-risk”), insurers then have to drive up 
costs to unaffordable levels for all individuals and employers.  This would alienate the pool 
within the exchange and result in a flood out – everyone looking only to purchase outside the 
exchange because of the great cost difference.  Fortunately, the ACA does provide some 
mechanisms to discourage this phenomenon.  First, the individual mandate ensures a larger pool 
of individuals, including healthy individuals who otherwise may have stayed out of the insurance 
market.   Additionally, certain regulations on insurance plans offered through the exchange can 
make them more attractive to consumers.  “Essential health benefits” also exist within and 
outside of the exchanges – such as keeping patient out-of-pocket expenses for medical care the 
same for plans purchased within or outside the exchange (NCSL, 2013). 
For states, the ACA does not have any provisions in place that prevent them from 
actively trying to discourage adverse selection (Jost, 2010, 4).  Indeed, unlike the federal 
government, states possess unique authority to prohibit the sale of insurance to individuals and 
small groups outside the exchange.  This measure, however, would be considered an extreme 
action to eliminate the outside market and avoid adverse selection.  An alternative to this would 
be to require plans outside the exchange to comply with regulations imposed within the exchange 
(Jost, 2010, 8). 
Adverse selection within the exchanges is also a significant risk.  If there is a pattern of 
preference for high-risk enrollees to pick a particular insurer within the Exchange, that insurance 
company is being adversely selected and will likely not continue offering plans through the 
Exchange.  An option for states to avoid this challenge is to develop a risk-adjustment program.  
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These programs move funds from health plans and insurers with lower-actuarial–risk enrollees to 
plans and insurers with higher-actuarial-risk enrollees (6).  But systems like this require actively 
collecting data and the ability to be flexible and responsive to changes within the market.  State 
exchanges must be sure they have the capacity to take on this task. 
California’s Exchange law requires that all plans offered outside the Exchange market 
must be offered in the Exchange as well (Cantor, 2012, 11).  Connecticut has historically had a 
very concentrated, uncompetitive health insurance market.  Furthermore, these companies have 
enjoyed a low level of regulation by the Connecticut Insurance Department (Andrews, 2014).  
This trend continued with the implementation of the ACA.  The healthy relationship with 
insurance companies that chose not to sell plans through the Exchange was maintained – they 
were not prohibited from selling insurance to force consumers to look to the exchange.  Instead, 
the Board chose to rely on the individual mandate, expecting that the large influx of newly 
insured will have a balanced risk pool. 
 
II. Certified Qualified Health Plans 
Design and Cost 
Linked to adverse selection is the states’ power to control their standards of price and 
value within their exchanges.  Though there are general federal regulations for what needs to be 
included in insurance plans and how much it can cost, states still have a significant amount of 
leeway to design these plans.  For example, states can approve any and all plans that meet the 
ACA’s minimum requirements, or they can set high certification standards that weed out some 
carriers’ plans.  The ACA does require that all plans within the exchanges be divided into tiers in 
order to structure choice and help consumers sort through price and value.  But a silver tiered 
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plan from Aetna may not be the same as a silver tiered plan from Blue Cross Blue Shield.  In 
New York, for example, any insurer may participate in the Exchange as long as it offers a plan 
on these federally required “metal levels” (typically designated Bronze, Silver, and Gold plan 
types).  Exchanges can encourage or require insurers to offer just a limited number of options to 
encourage competition based on price and value.  Exchanges could limit the variability in benefit 
design beyond what the federal law requires to limit adverse selection and, if authorized, 
negotiate aggressively with health plans on price (The California Endowment, 2011, 41).  
Internet tools, quality ratings, and satisfaction surveys can help guide plan selection for 
consumers (Jost, 2010, 12).  States could also implement a policy where plan designs are 
periodically reviewed and re-approved for participation in the exchanges.   
In Connecticut, a committee within the Board helped design outlines of plans, including 
what specific services were needed in each of the plans.  For example, consumer advocates 
argued heavily against having deductible payments apply to regular appointments.  Deductibles 
are a set amount the individual pays usually before the insurance company starts paying.  For 
example, the patient pays the first $1,000 before the insurance company starts chipping in.  The 
reason insurance companies like this is it drives down cost – people avoid unnecessary medical 
care especially while they are still under the $1,000 amount.  The fact that consumer advocates 
made sure this deductible did not apply for routine visits means that a newly insured individual 
will not have to pay the full expense of their first doctor visit – that is exempt from the 
deductible.  However, insurance companies are still covered in the event of a very expensive 
emergency room bill – the customer pays the full deductible there.  These plans were then sent to 
insurance companies so they could sort out the specifics and pricing.  The Connecticut Insurance 
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Department (CID) reviews and approves changes in these plans by carriers (Kaiser Family 
Foundation Connecticut Marketplace Profile, 2013).   
 
Negotiation with Insurance Companies 
States have the option of having insurers submit bids to participate, or a general 
negotiating strategy with insurers (Jost, 2010, 20).  States can act as an active purchaser, 
essentially managing the competition and negotiating product offerings with insurers.  This 
would entail a back-and-forth between the Board and insurers – almost bartering to find a 
compromised system of pricing that works for affordability to consumers and profit to insurers.  
Alternatively, the exchanges can be open marketplaces, or clearinghouses where all qualified 
insurers are welcome to join.  This model relies more on market forces to generate product 
offerings (NCSL, 2014).  States must consider the size of the exchange, the number of insurers, 
and bargaining power when weighing these options. 
California’s Exchange, for instance, acts as an active purchaser, selectively contracting 
health coverage.  Bids from insurers were evaluated based on their goals of affordability, 
competition, alignment of delivery systems, and long-term partnerships (Kaiser Family 
Foundation New York Marketplace Profile, 2013).  Unlike California, Connecticut has operated 
as a clearinghouse, accepting plans from all qualified insurance companies.  No negotiating with 
insurance companies took place.  The plan skeleton designs went to carriers, and the carriers 
filled in the details themselves.  However, legislation has been passed that acknowledges that for 
2015 and later the Exchange can opt to utilize a competitive bidding process and develop 
selective contracting criteria (CT Health Plan Benefits & Qualifications Advisory Committee 
Memo, 2012, 2). 
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Concluding Remarks 
 
This chapter discussed the paramount decisions states had to make while implementing 
the exchanges of the ACA.  If the coverage reforms are to serve their true purpose, the exchanges 
are paramount to success.  If the exchanges function as planned, they will expand coverage, 
improve the quality of health insurance coverage and, eventually, reduce costs in the health care 
sector.  Determinants that seem small, such as the make-up of the board, or how they interact 
with insurance companies, will make a difference in each state-designed exchange.  The long-
term effects of these decisions obviously have not reached fruition; however, it is possible at this 
stage to look at a particular state and determine its initial successes and struggles with 
implementation and tie these outcomes to specific decisions made by legislators and 
policymakers that formed its pathway.  Next, we turn to Connecticut to do just this. 															 	
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A Close-Up on Connecticut’s Access Health CT 
“Connecticut is well-recognized as a national leader in effectively implementing the Affordable 
Care Act, exceeding enrollment targets set by the nonpartisan Congressional Budget office by 136 
percent and exceeding our own goals by 98 percent. This is success by any definition.” 
– Connecticut Lieutenant Governor Nancy Wyman 
 
 In the media, Connecticut has been referred to as a national leader in implementing the 
Affordable Care Act.  Connecticut’s enrollment numbers validate that the state has reached a 
large portion of the uninsured.  In February of 2014, Connecticut was at 238% of its enrollment 
target for the first four months.  This put the state way ahead of all others.  As of April 1, 2014, 
Access Health CT has enrolled 208,301 residents in plans with private insurance carriers and 
government-funded Medicaid (Access Health CT, 2014).  The state has received praise from 
many high-ranking federal officials.  Other states are even approaching Connecticut to use its 
proposed “exchange in a box,” which includes the technology and workflow processes that have 
been significant in its success (Hickins, 2014).  This chapter will rewind and establish why 
Connecticut’s implementation has been portrayed as such a triumph.  This will include an 
overview of relevant Connecticut health reform history, reexamining structural decisions, and 
analyzing enrollment data.  Apart from a few glitches, Access Health CT is well deserving of the 
praise it has received for its implementation so far.  This chapter will outline factors that set 
Connecticut apart from other states’ efforts and enabled success, like its established 
infrastructure for health policy.  Interviews with seven key players in Access Health CT’s 
implementation also indicate a number of areas that could use improvement.  These issues will 
be explained, along with the potential impact they could have on Access Health CT’s future.   
 
A Step Ahead: Past Health Reform Efforts Helped Set Connecticut Up For Success  
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Similar to Massachusetts, Connecticut advocates and legislators had been hard at work to 
tackle the challenge of health care reform long before national legislation was passed.  The 
present success of Access Health CT can be attributed in part to the efforts of advocates and 
public officials that had been working together on previous reform efforts.  This experience 
working on health reform and collaborating with one another created an infrastructure within the 
health reform community, and these relationships were used to build an exchange structure that 
would work.   
 Organizations and advocacy groups in Connecticut have fought for changes to the system 
for decades.  Before the ACA, state legislators in Connecticut had passed numerous health 
reform bills, which helped establish solid foundations for the ACA.  For example, Connecticut 
had established solid Medicaid and Children’s Heath Insurance Program (CHIP) programs called 
HUSKY.  Membership in HUSKY is broken down into four categories, as Table 3 displays.  
This structured system of Medicaid that was already in place made the expansion offered by the 
ACA much easier to implement. 
 
Table 3. Connecticut Children’s Health Insurance HUSKY Client Categories 
HUSKY Type Individuals Covered 
HUSKY A Children, parents, and pregnant women 
HUSKY B 
Children whose parents earn too much to 
qualify for Medicaid 
HUSKY C 
Disabled adults, low-income seniors, 
individuals receiving long-term care 
HUSKY D 
Covers adults who do nott have minor 
children (this began in 2010 when 
Connecticut became first state in country to 
expand Medicaid under the ACA) 
Source: CT Mirror 2013 
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In addition to a solid existing Medicaid structure, Connecticut also had other health 
reform proposals passed with help from organizations such as the Universal Health Care 
Foundation of Connecticut.  In collaboration with many groups across the state, the Foundation 
built relationships with medical societies, hospitals, businesses, and labor groups to create a 
proposal that would help provide affordable health coverage to 98% of Connecticut residents 
(SustiNet Health Partnership, 2014).  Public Act No. 09-148, An Act Concerning the 
Establishment of the SustiNet Plan, was passed in 2009 and planned to have enrollment start in 
July of 2012.  While the reform was not a model for the ACA as Massachusetts’s reform was, it 
still had a number of important similarities that aided Connecticut in getting a head start on 
implementation.  SustiNet looked to provide statewide health care plans for Connecticut 
residents regardless of employment status, age, or pre-existing conditions (SustiNet Health 
Partnership, 2014).   
When the ACA was passed in March of 2010, the SustiNet Board was just getting 
underway.  Since many of the functionalities of SustiNet overlapped with those of the ACA, 
efforts were shifted to Access Health CT.  The SustiNet Board was asked to report to the General 
Assembly in May of 2010 and advise how to implement the federal law in Connecticut.  SustiNet 
board Co-Chair Kevin Lembo said of the report, it “plots a course for our future conversations 
and acknowledges the federal interaction in a solid way” (Stuart, 2014).  The SustiNet Board of 
Directors issued several repots to the Governor and General Assembly with a series of 
recommendations for the ACA’s implementation.  SustiNet’s structure and guidance were 
imperative to gathering the right experts and advisers to help structure Access Health CT.  
Legislators, advocates, and experts already had experience coming together on advisory 
committees and knew how the processes of meetings went (SustiNet Health Partnership, 2011).  
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The path to fight political battles to get health reform legislation through had been slightly worn 
and the communication channels opened.1  In addition to having a solid foundation of 
knowledgeable people within the state, Access Health CT also brought in new individuals with 
valuable experience.  For example, Access Health CT CEO Kevin Counihan served as the chief 
marketing officer for the Massachusetts Health Insurance Connector Authority – which helped 
Massachusetts in its health reform in 2006. 
 
Set For Success: CT Has Earned Its Label as an ACA Implementation Leader 
 With solid experience of activism in health reform, Connecticut’s decision to establish its 
own state-run exchange was the clear choice.  In comparison with other states, Connecticut was 
relatively successful in getting its exchange off the ground in part because of this head start.  The 
trials of the national healthcare.gov demonstrate the clear challenges of implementing an 
exchange.  When the ACA passed, DHHS did not think they would be running twenty-seven 
exchanges and partnering to design seven.  The burden of serving so many states with the federal 
program meant a much more massive job than they anticipated, which resulted in catastrophe 
when the healthcare.gov website was finally online for open enrollment.  Chad Brooker, the 
Director of Exchange Policy and Legal Advisor at Access Health CT, said, “Designing an 
exchange for one state alone is a daunting task.  I cannot fathom how the Department of Health 
and Human Services is trying to organize designs and data processes with twenty-seven times the 
amount of work we’re doing.”  While the federal government and other states found themselves 
on their heels in terms of implementing exchanges, Connecticut’s recent history of health care 
reform and collaboration meant that the political will and capacity were in place for effective 																																																								
1 As of September 2011, Connecticut Lieutenant Governor Nancy Wyman confirmed that SustiNet no longer 
effectively exists as an active policy-making body, but rather as an information source to inform the decisions of the 
Health Care Cabinet within the state (McQuaid, 2011). 
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implementation.  Connecticut’s jump on designing Access Health CT so quickly after the law 
was passed made getting everything done within the short timelines given much easier.  They 
embraced the program, engaged their communities, and could focus on actively advertising for 
the change (Scotti, 2013).   
Connecticut’s political support also allowed it to be the first state to accept the ACA’s 
expansion of Medicaid.  Many states, particularly those with Republican-run politics, rejected 
the expansion as a snub to the ACA in general.  In these states, a large portion of the population, 
those in the lowest-income bracket, were left without Medicaid as an option for health insurance.  
Connecticut’s decision will allow a wider bracket of individuals to qualify for HUSKY, while 
relieving state taxpayers of the cost of the expansion.  Consumer advocates and Access Health 
CT Board member Victoria Veltri have been vocal about the benefits this decision has had for 
Connecticut: “It’s been a great change for coverage,” said Veltri.  “We have a lot of people at 
very low incomes in Connecticut.  This has almost doubled the number of people inside the 
program.  Luckily – and I say this almost every day – we live in Connecticut, and we understand 
the importance of covering our low-income population” (Campbell, 2012). 
Some states, like Texas, do not even have a Board to help the federal government set up 
their exchange.  In contrast, Connecticut has an active Board of Directors with subcommittees 
and advisory committees that meet at least bi-monthly.  Advisory committees include consumer 
experience and outreach, health plan benefits and qualifications, brokers, agents, and navigators, 
and the small business health options programs “SHOP.”  The quasi-governmental structure of 
Access Health CT has allowed it to be efficient in decision-making.   
The structure and organized nature of the Board also allowed it to be a strong leader 
within the ACA implementation community on a national scale.  Activists from Connecticut, 
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such as small business advocate Kevin Galvin, have been resources for federal policymakers 
since before the ACA was even passed.  Galvin even participated at the Small Business 
Financing Forum, a group called together by President Barack Obama to sketch out ideas and 
strategies for health reform (Galvin, 2014).  The importance of this is that many Connecticut 
implementers were at the center of reforms from the beginning.  They understood the changes, 
and were innovators at the front of taking action to make the program work.   
Their collective role as key actors from the outset also allowed Connecticut to be resilient 
in fighting for implementation flexibility from the federal government.  Peter Van Loon, Chief 
Operating Operator of Access Health CT, believes that Connecticut’s ability to exercise a certain 
level of “creative disobedience” was imperative to the success that it has had (Van Loon, 2014).  
This “creative disobedience” included not following some orders from the federal government.  
For example, drawing on the rich experience of its principals, Access Health CT realized early 
on that it was not feasible for them to accommodate all of the Connecticut Medicare and 
Medicaid Services’ regulations for the first few years of ACA implementation.  They decided to 
scale back the functionality of Access Health CT by twenty percent, and focus more effort on the 
most important aspects of coverage for customers.  “We wanted to build a Mercedes,” CEO 
Kevin Counihan said.  “But we’ve scaled back to a Ford Focus.  And that has worked” (Pandey, 
2014).  Van Loon agrees, stressing that trying to cover all the directives from CMS would have 
been disastrous, and that scaling back even more could ensure fuller, guaranteed functionality.   
 
Outreach and Awareness: Navigator and Assistors in Connecticut 
 
“The government is going to make you – mandate – that you buy insurance from an insurance 
company or you pay a tax… That’s five swear words in one sentence.” 
-Ellen Andrews, Executive Director of Connecticut Health Policy Project 
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 Experience with health care reform also allowed Connecticut policymakers to strategize 
an effective outreach plan based upon what had worked or not worked in the past.  In 2012, 
Access Health CT started to gather input to help design and market the Exchange to its 
customers.  Many advocates were wary due to Connecticut’s mixed record with similar efforts.  
In the early years of HUSKY, a lot of money was spent for outreach and awareness.  However it 
was not effective in attracting new applications or getting families covered (Connecticut Health 
Policy Project, 2012).  The CT Health Policy Project conducted focus groups with parents of 
uninsured children that the program was trying to reach, and found that a big factor in parents 
signing up for coverage was doing so through people that they trust, in formats they are used to.  
Moreover, it was necessary that they hear the message several times.  Recommended channels 
were community organizations, schools, churches, and other trusted institutions. 
 Access Health CT listened.  The current Navigator and Assistor Outreach Program is the 
result of a unique partnership between Access Health CT and Connecticut’s Office of the 
Healthcare Advocate (OHA), and has proven to play a key role in the Exchange’s community 
outreach efforts (Eastern AHEC, Inc., 2014).  Navigators and in-person assistors are 
organizations and individuals who are in charge of helping to educate people about he new 
system, understand their choices, and facilitate selection of a health insurance plan (Dash et al., 
2013, 7)  Six organizations have been tapped in Connecticut as Navigator organizations, and the 
state trained over 300 individuals to be Assisters.  Training was thirty-four hours for assisters and 
forty for navigators, and included passing a certification exam (Kaiser Family Foundation 
Connecticut Marketplace Profile, 2013).   
These people were the frontline workers, interacting with residents to make sure they 
understand what the ACA can offer them, and ensuring they can make informed decisions 
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regarding their health insurance coverage.  Counihan said of the outreach program, “It’s a new 
law and we have an obligation to explain it.  A lot of things that have inhibited people from 
buying insurance or that have made it too expensive will go away on January first.  People need 
to know about these benefits” (Gallo, 2014).  Access Health CT was also the only state exchange 
to open stores where residents of Connecticut could walk in and talk to trained individuals about 
enrollment options.  The stores were opened in cities with high concentrations of uninsured 
people, such as New Britain and New Haven.  They were inspired by Apple, Inc.’s famous 
storefronts, with employees greeting people at the door and knowledgeable staff to explain the 
process of signing up for health insurance.  The effects of these stores were noteworthy; they 
signed up, on average, 300 to 400 people per day (Gallo, 2014). 
 
Looking to the Future: Problems that Could Threaten CT’s Success 
 The Hartford Business Journal sums up Access Health CT’s position accurately in one of 
its recent headlines: “Exchange leaders deserve praise, but plenty of work remains” (Hartford 
Business Journal Editorial, 2014).  Comparably high enrollment numbers, impeccable project 
management, and working technology were made possible by an infrastructure in the state that 
offered insight into what they needed to accomplish.  That is the good news.  As implementation 
continues in the days and months ahead, however, there are many unanswered questions and 
future problems to solve.   
 
Reaching the Remaining Uninsured 
As a practical matter, if an uninsured individual was not reached through the first round 
of outreach and open enrollment, new strategies must be employed to engage them.  Access 
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Health CT enrollment currently stands at 208,301 enrollees (Access Health CT, 2014).  It is 
unclear how many of the individuals signing up for coverage through the Exchange were 
uninsured and how many switched from other insurance plans.  However, uninsured totals for 
Connecticut were approximately 344,582 in 2012 (CT Uninsured Profile Summary, 2012).  
Thus, it is clear that there is a remaining group of individuals that have not signed up for 
coverage.   
Going forward, it is possible that Access Health CT will suffer the same problem that 
Massachusetts did during its reform; namely, reaching that last group of uninsured that was not 
brought into the system in round one.  To address this challenge, the exchange should engage as 
many stakeholders as possible, hold meetings and forums to share best practices and spread 
innovative ideas, and target the message of signing up for insurance at crucial transitions when 
people think of insurance, such as marriage, birth of a child, illness or death in the family 
(Connecticut Health Policy Project, 2012).   
 As was the case in Massachusetts, reaching the Hispanic population in Connecticut has 
proven to be challenging.  Barriers this community faces include language, culture, financial 
limitations, lack of access to the Internet, and fears of giving the federal government information 
in the belief it could be used to deport family members (Radelat, 2014).  The fact that 
immigrants who lack permanent legal status are not allowed under the ACA to enroll through 
any state insurance exchange contributes to confusion over eligibility.  However, as Elena Rios, 
president of the National Hispanic Health Foundation, points out, the problems Hispanics are 
facing with ACA enrollment are nothing new.  Most public programs face the same dilemma.   
 A similar approach to the one Massachusetts took will be necessary in Connecticut.  In 
order to pursue this strategy, Connecticut must identify which organizations and people are 
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“trusted messengers” for hard-to-reach communities.  An open back-and-forth between 
organizations relating to constituents and policymakers, and a simple enrollment process will 
help sign up more of the Hispanic population (Connecticut Health Policy Project, 2012).  
Additionally, more work must be done on the Spanish-language Access Health CT website, 
which launched in late February 2014 (almost five months after the English-language site went 
up on October 1, 2013).  Several Assistors in Connecticut have claimed that the website is 
difficult to read, and they end up translating and interpreting the English-language website when 
trying to help Latinos enroll (Radelat, 2014). 
 
Potential Provider Shortages 
Now that Access Health CT has signed up thousands of residents who have lacked 
coverage, these people will be searching for primary care physicians.  The Connecticut State 
Medical Society is warning of a major shortage of physicians in the state that could lead to a lack 
of access to doctors for the newly insured (Bordonaro, 2012).  Dr. Douglas Gerard, an internist in 
New Hartford, sees it as a simple supply and demand imbalance, “They are increasing the 
demand side of patients, but didn’t increase the supply side of physicians.”  As was the case in 
Massachusetts, the fear for policymakers is that newly insured individuals will become frustrated 
with an inability to find a provider.  This frustration is dangerous because it has the potential to 
expand to a “is coverage worth it for me” mentality.   
Inaccuracy of carrier provider networks has the potential to compound this problem.  
New enrollees receive a list from the insurance company that that includes all providers included 
in the “covered network.” When they begin to call providers, however, they may be unable to 
schedule an actual appointment.  DSS commissioned a secret shopper survey of health plan 
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networks in 2006 to verify Medicaid provider panels.  People posing as HUSKY members called 
the providers listed and were only able to secure needed appointments with one in four providers 
listed in the plan directories (Andrews, 2013, slide twelve).  This would be disastrous if the same 
happened to people signing up for coverage through Access Health CT. 
One suggested solution has been to allow nurse practitioners to treat patients and 
prescribe medications independent of licensed physicians.  A current proposal to the Connecticut 
legislature by the Malloy administration would require APRNs to work with a physician for the 
first three years after becoming licensed, but then would allow then to practice alone (Levin 
Becker, 2014).  Some argue that legislators should not reduce the training and education needed 
to provide medical care.  They worry that there has not been enough discussion about patient 
safety issues.  Supporters of the bill claim that APRNs in Connecticut are required to have a 
graduate degree in nursing or a related field and certification from a national organization.  They 
claim nurse practitioners could be a solution to the potential problem of provider shortages in the 
state.   
 
Cost Containment 
In addition to reaching the remaining uninsured and addressing provider shortages, cost is 
still the elephant in the room for the implementation of health insurance exchanges.  The United 
States spends more of its gross domestic product (GDP) on health care than any other developed 
democracy.  In 2008, the United States spent more than $7,500 per capita on health care, which 
was more than double what Germany spent and almost three times what New Zealand spent 
(Orentlicher, 2011, 66).  Just like Massachusetts’s health reform, the ACA focuses on expanding 
access to coverage initially, and then defers cost containment to the following step.  As a state 
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with the fourth highest premiums for health insurance, cost is a looming problem that 
Connecticut will face for a long time.  First, there is the problem of health care service and goods 
costs rising each year.  On top of this, there is the fear that the new pool of insured residents 
through Access Health CT will be adversely selected.  If the newly insured are older and sicker 
and incur most health care costs, it is not worth it for insurance companies because they are not 
making as much money.  Therefore, the response from insurance companies is to drive up prices 
for everyone, both sick and healthy, to make sure their profit margin is where they want it to be.  
This increase, combined with the natural increase in health care services and goods, make the 
“affordable” part of the ACA seem less and less attainable.   
With respect to adverse selection within the pool of consumers buying through Access 
Health CT, information regarding the health status of individuals new to coverage will not be 
available for months.  Claims from those who started coverage in January of 2014 will not even 
be available from carriers until May due to the lengthiness of the process.  As such, risk-pool 
assessments will not be available until a full year of coverage has been reviewed.  Only then will 
we know whether some degree of adverse selection has resulted in insurance companies needing 
to raise costs moving forward.   
Adverse selection will be an ongoing assessment for Access Health CT and exchanges 
nationwide.  With the enrollment period for many exchanges ending on March 31, 2014, the 
numbers are only just coming out about the age of individuals signing up through exchanges.  
The breakdown of numbers from the federal government is still not available.  As discussed, the 
fear with adverse selection is a “death spiral.”  This would be a possibility if the enrollment of 
individuals were skewed to older individuals with higher health costs, driving up costs from 
insurance companies and making it unaffordable for many individuals (Universal Health CT, 
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2014).  Table 4 demonstrates that the age distribution of members signing up for insurance 
includes a large portion of enrollees, 30%, under the age of 35.  While being younger does not 
automatically equate to being healthier, the aggregate group of younger individuals are likely to 
balance out the older and typically sicker people signing up for coverage. 
 
Table 4. Connecticut’s Exchange Enrollment Data for October 1, 2013 – March 31, 2014 
Total Enrolled CT Residents 208,301 
Record in CT set on last day: 5,917 people signed up in one day 
Enrolled with private insurance carriers 78,713 
Enrolled in Medicaid: 129,588 
Age Breakdown as of 3/27/2014 55 and older: 33% 45-54: 24% 
Under 35: 30% 
Source: Access Health CT Website 
 
According to data from Access Health CT, the median age of individuals signing up 
through the exchange is in the mid to upper 30s.  More specific data will be released once the 
last-minute enrollees have been tabulated; however, the data in Table 4 is promising in that the 
age breakdown is not significantly skewed on the higher end.  Additionally, a report issued by 
the Kaiser Family Foundation (2014) suggests that fears about a “death spiral” should not be as 
prominent as they are.  Their study suggests that premiums are not as sensitive to the mix of 
enrolled individuals as some people think, particularly with respect to age (Levitt, Glaxon & 
Damico 2013).   
Even if adverse selection is avoided, however, cost and affordability for consumers will 
continue to be a struggle for Access Health CT.  Two important suggestions for keeping costs 
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down in Connecticut are stricter qualified health plans (QHPs) and active purchasing with 
insurance companies.  QHPs are plans that are approved for sale in state exchanges.  Federal 
guidelines have set criteria for QHPs to participate in an exchange, but states can decide to put in 
place additional requirements.  Alta Lash, Executive Director of United Connecticut Action for 
Neighborhoods (UCAN), was on the eight-person Standard Plan Design Committee for Access 
Health CT.  The committee spent twenty-nine hours drafting plan designs as to what to include 
in each tier of plans: bronze, silver, and gold.  Lash, a consumer advocate, emphasized the 
importance of getting only big health care costs – i.e. expensive emergency visits, surgeries – to 
count towards a purchaser’s deductible (Lash, 2014).  Additional victories for consumers 
included ensuring complete coverage for preventative care, and flat fees for co-payments so 
individuals know going into an appointment what they are expected to contribute for a particular 
service.  The plan designs went through a drafting period that included public comment and 
editing states.  Overall the plan designs themselves have not had too many objections.  The real 
issue that has been raised is how these skeleton designs are passed along to insurance carriers 
who are then able to assign their own prices. 
 Access Health CT made the decision to not negotiate plan pricing with insurance 
companies.  The QHPs were sent out to participating carriers, who assigned prices and wrote up 
the details of the bronze, silver, and gold plans they would offer through Access Health CT.  The 
language of the legislation passed for the Exchange does empower the Board to exercise active 
purchasing:  “the exchange is authorized and empowered to […] limit the number of plans 
offered, and use selective criteria in determining which plans to offer, through the exchange, 
provided individuals and employers have an adequate number and selection of choices” (SB921, 
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Connecticut’s 2011 Health Insurance Exchange Act, 2011).  There are two conflicting arguments 
made by interest groups in Connecticut regarding active purchasing. 
 Consumer advocates insist that Access Health CT must negotiate on behalf of consumers.  
To be clear, negotiation can take many forms, but the premise is that Access Health CT should 
have a back-and-forth with insurance companies, bargaining with proposed costs from other 
competitors, and have the power to say “that’s not good enough” if necessary.  Proponents of 
active purchasing compare Access Health CT to a large employer.  Ninety percent of large 
employers negotiate with insurers on behalf of their employees to maximize both value and 
affordability (Andrews, 2012).  Since Connecticut’s goal is between 250,000 and 300,000 state 
residents, the idea is that the state can use this pool of potential consumers almost as if they were 
a group of employees at a businesses shopping for health insurance.  Consumers cite the decision 
made by California’s exchange to exercise active purchasing, and also use Massachusetts’s 
experience as well.  In 2007, the MA Connector was not satisfied with premium bids offered by 
carriers, so the Governor asked insurers to go back and “sharpen their pencils.”  Advocates also 
stress that Connecticut has been a leader in this reform, and although historically insurance 
company interests have been kneeled to, now is the time for Access Health CT to step up.  They 
emphasize that federal regulations are meant to be a floor, not a ceiling for state exchange 
standards (Andrews, 2012).   
 Others involved in implementation see active purchasing as unnecessary, and potentially 
even detrimental to Connecticut’s marketplace.  Although no formal comment or discussion has 
been made of Access Health CT’s decision to not negotiate with insurance companies, Chad 
Brooker, a policy analyst at Access Health CT, has said that active purchasing will not have the 
effect that consumer advocates believe it will.  The bargaining power of Access Health CT with 
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insurance companies is not great, even with a large pool of potential consumers, because so little 
is known about the health and needs of that group.  Many insurance companies already are not 
participating on the Exchange yet, partially due to how little is known about the risks that these 
businesses are taking.  Because of this, Brooker emphasizes that negotiation would go a lot 
differently in reality than many advocates dream (Brooker, 2014).  Furthermore, Brooker points 
to the naturally competitive nature of Access Health CT for insurance companies.  If all 
insurance companies are bargained down to the same price, the natural competitive forces are 
driven out.  Brooker pointed to Healthy CT, the non-profit carrier currently participating in 
Access Health CT, as an example of the benefits of natural competition.  Healthy CT only has 
about 3% of signups in the state (Haigh, 2014).  This abysmal number has been due to a number 
of challenges, including lack of brand recognition and plans that were priced too high to compete 
with other insurers.  In response to this low sign-up percentage, Healthy CT will now be 
incentivized to lower prices during the next enrollment cycle, which Brooker confirmed the 
insurance company is already working on.    
 The battle of whether or not to active purchase could take a turn if a current bill in the 
legislature, An Act Concerning the Duties of the Connecticut Health Insurance Exchange, 
passes.  This bill would direct Access Health CT to negotiate premiums with insurers on behalf 
of consumers.  A similar bill died on the state House of Representatives calendar last year. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
This chapter makes clear that Connecticut has earned its name as a leader in the 
implementation of the ACA exchanges.  The existing infrastructure for health reform allowed 
Connecticut to have a quick jump on the ACA immediately after the law was passed, and even 
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participate in recommendations to the federal government.  This leadership role allowed them 
some flexibility in implementation, which officials took advantage of by scaling back some 
functionalities of Access Health CT for the first few years.  These decisions streamlined 
Connecticut’s focus and enabled implementers to do a comparatively smaller amount of work, 
better.  This included better outreach, better technology, and more manpower to double-check 
and test-run. 
 While Connecticut has succeeded in comparison with other states, going forward, there 
are changes that have to be made.  In Massachusetts, the “learning organization,” the Connector, 
had to make a number of changes throughout the years of implementation to improve the process 
and overall health care sector.  Connecticut faces some similar problems: in particular, reaching 
the remaining uninsured and cost containment.  To ensure that success continues, adaptations 
will have to be made. Ideally, the strong infrastructure and political bandwidth that this state has 
developed will continue to improve Access Health CT until all residents of Connecticut have 
improved access to coverage and health care. 		
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Concluding Remarks: Where Do We Go From Here? 
"The hallmark of health reform has been the concept of shared responsibility, the sense of shared 
ownership of a common value that our nation benefits from more citizens realizing the peace of 
mind of health insurance coverage.  We must have the patience to recognize the implementation of 
the ACA will take time to be fully realized.” –Kevin Counihan, CEO of Access Health CT 
 
When the ACA was passed in 2010, Connecticut was poised for success much like 
Massachusetts before its health reform in 2006.  The state had a high uninsured rate at eight 
percent, with the potential to sign up a lot of residents for coverage.  Connecticut also had 
political focus on the issue and a health reform infrastructure in place.  The ACA was the big 
sweeping reform backed by federal start-up funds that could make a positive change in health 
care for Connecticut residents.  The path this federal reform chose to take was modeled after 
Massachusetts’s 2006 plan: get people quality, affordable health insurance first, then reduce the 
costs of health care for individuals and the government.  The hope was to have the DHHS guide 
states through the process of building a health insurance exchange tailored to the demographics 
and needs of each state. 
 Connecticut’s advantageous decision-making started with just that – designing its own 
exchange and committing to implementation.  The state has exceled in maintaining political 
support, keeping focus on the issue, and selecting well when outsourcing for tasks such as 
technology and outreach programs.  Access Health CT signed up over 200,000 people for health 
insurance in the first six-month enrollment period, or 30% of the eligible population in the state 
(Access Health CT, 2014).  Other consistently successful states throughout implementation 
rollout are California and New York (John, 2014).  Both of these states had health policy arenas 
established in their states, and political support.  On the other hand, Maryland is a state that had 
political will for health reform and change, but struggled with technology and has floundered as 
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a result.  Frozen computer screens, error codes, and web site crashes plagued most of Maryland’s 
first enrollment period.  Meredith Cohn, a reporter in Maryland, spent two days – including two 
calls to the exchange’s call center and seven repeats of entering her personal information – 
buying insurance (Ornstein, 2014).  This is an example of how all of the factors that came 
together in Connecticut were like a recipe – without one and every one, success would not have 
added up the way it did. While Maryland was projected to be a leader in ACA reform, the 
Exchange failed in transparency during implementation and did not have a structure in place that 
would encourage decisions-makers to assess problems and move to fix them.  They did not have 
same recipe as Connecticut.   
Connecticut has over 7,000 non-profit organizations, many of which are devoted to 
health-related concerns (Galvin, 2014).  These organizations worked on past reform efforts – like 
HUSKY and SustiNet – and helped Connecticut step up their game with respect to health 
policies.  Advocates, public engagers, leadership, experts – relationships between these groups 
had been already through the health reform process and were ready to operate in a way that led to 
successful ACA implementation.  A key decision that arose from this infrastructure was the 
“creative disobedience” of Connecticut policymakers.  Cutting back and pushing timelines out 
further than the federal government was asking was risky but necessary.  Access Health CT’s 
technology worked not only because the companies it contracted out to did their job, but also 
because the task we handed over to them was smaller and more manageable.  This was the recipe 
– infrastructure, political support, and smart decisions – that allowed Connecticut to be 
commended for early implementation success. 
 While Connecticut should celebrate these early implementation victories, several 
potentially debilitating problems have arisen that threaten Connecticut’s success.  The experience 
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of Massachusetts warns us that cost containment, provider shortages, and difficulty reaching 
certain populations, are likely to persist as struggles for implementation efforts.  Initial 
implementation efforts in Connecticut suggest the same will likely be true in our state.  
Consumer advocates still worry about the affordability of health insurance plans for consumers.  
Insurance companies are still assessing whether there is significant adverse selection within 
Access Health CT’s participants, which could drive up insurance costs for all residents.  All of 
this swirls around the steady increase in health care services and goods costs.  Pair these 
increases with the high expectation of provider shortages in the state, and it seems surprising that 
policymakers in the state are still optimistic about the future of Access Health CT. 
But there is a reason they are optimistic.  Steps can be taken to combat these problems.  
Some have already been put into motion.  Bills awaiting legislative action include one that 
requires Access Health CT to directly negotiate with health insurance companies over premium 
rates.  Another measure proposes using a State Innovation Model (SIM) planning grant of $2.8 
million from the federal Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) to promote 
affordability, value, and eliminate inequities in health care.  This plan was submitted and 
accepted by CMS at the end of 2013 and it encompasses a variety of changes to create a more 
sustainable health care system.  Unlike the ACA, this reform focuses more on improving the 
provider and care side of public health, rather than insurance coverage and access.  The plan 
includes measures such as requiring electronic health records, focus on preventative care, and 
arming consumers with the tools they need to make health decisions.  The specifics of 
implementation are still in the works as of April 2014, but this ambitious vision for change looks 
promising (Universal Health Care Foundation of Connecticut, 2013).  If successful, this could 
	 61 
help mitigate the cost concerns of Access Health CT’s future insurance plans by keeping the 
prices of health care services and goods down. 
An additional proposal from the Malloy administration would allow advanced practice 
registered nurses (APRNs) to work independently of doctors would change the medical 
landscape in Connecticut and expand access to primary care for citizens.  The National 
Governors Association stated, “expanded utilization of [APRNs] has the potential to increase 
access to health care, particularly in historically underserved areas” (NGA, 2012).  At the time of 
writing, this bill has passed the Senate and House of Representatives and is moving to Governor 
Malloy’s desk, which he has publicly stated that he will sign.  This is a positive indication that 
Connecticut policymakers are willing to adapt at least some changes needed to aid ACA’s 
implementation. 
 The content of these proposed adjustments to exchange implementation are important; 
however, it is of equal importance that Connecticut will continue to benefit from the general 
willingness of Connecticut politicians and advocates to fight for something better.  Throughout 
this thesis process, I have met individuals that would fight each other tooth and nail over health 
care reform decisions. But all were passionate and dedicated to their efforts to make change.  In 
2002, Gary Rose wrote that Connecticut politics has a reputation as the “land of steady habits” 
and “the Constitution State,” due to its predictable and stable system of politics, as well as its 
long tradition of noble self-government.  This predictability includes a stark party division in the 
legislature.  Even so, Connecticut is a small state.  Legislators, advocates, representatives of 
different industries and organizations know each other and many have worked together for 
decades.  This existing infrastructure that helped Connecticut with its initial success in exchange 
implementation will be key for making key adaptations throughout the rest of Access Health 
	 62 
CT’s implementation. Building on the existing reform infrastructure and the advocacy networks,  
Connecticut needs to be able to respond to implementation challenges as a “learning 
organization,” in ways similar to the Massachusetts model.  As long as we acknowledge when 
problems arise and utilize the infrastructure we have to solve that problem, we can make the best 
of the ACA work for our state and increase both the quality and affordability of health insurance 
for residents.  Connecticut should continue to be a leader in ACA implementation, but must 
settle in for the long road ahead. 																						 	
	 63 
Works Cited 
 
Access Health CT. “Access Health CT Enrolls 197,878 Connecticut Residents in Quality,  
Affordable Health Care Coverage: Outreach Under Way to Those Who Could Not  
Complete Applications Last Night." 1 Apr. 2014. Web. 1 Apr. 2014.  
<http://learn.accesshealthct.com/wp-  
content/uploads/2013/02/AHCT_final_numbers_pressrelease.pdf>. 
 
Andrews, Ellen. “Why CT’s health insurance exchange needs to negotiate.” CT Health  
Insurance Exchange Watch. 6 Nov. 2012.  
<http://cthealthexchange.blogspot.com/2012/11/why-cts-health-insurance- 
exchange-needs.html>. 
 
Andrews, Ellen. “Access Health CT: CT’s health insurance exchange.” PowerPoint  
presentation. Trinity College, Hartford, CT. 26 Apr. 2013.  
<www.cthealthpolicy.org/pdfs/20130426_trinity_conference.pdf>. 
 
Andrews, Ellen. Personal interview. 14 Feb. 2014.  
 
Archambault, Josh. “SURPRISE: Massachusetts Is Home To America’s Worst- 
Performing ObamaCare Exchange.” Forbes. 20 Jan. 2014. Web. Jan. 29 2014.  
<http://www.forbes.com/sites/theapothecary/2014/01/29/surprise-massachusetts- 
is-home-to-americas-worst-performing-obamacare-exchange>. 
 
Brooker, Chad. Personal Interview. 2 Apr. 2014. 
 
Long, Sharon K., Dana Goin, and Victoria Lynch. “Reaching the Remaining Uninsured  
in Massachusetts: Challenges and Opportunities.” Blue Cross Blue Shield  
Foundation Massachusetts. Mar. 2013. Web. 4 Apr. 2014.  
<http://bluecrossmafoundation.org/sites/default/files/download/publication/Unins 
ured_in_MA_Report_FINAL_0.pdf>. 
 
Bordonaro, Greg. “CT Group Pushes Health Exchange Shakeup.” Hartford Business  
Journal. 4 Jun. 2012. Web. 5 Apr. 2014.  
<http://www.hartfordbusiness.com/article/20111130/NEWS01/311309999/ct- 
group-pushes-health-exchange-shakeup>. 
 
Campbell, Susan. “CT Is “Hell-Yes” On Medicaid.” Connecticut Health I-Team. 3 Sep.  
2012. Web. 26 Apr. 2014. <http://c-hit.org/2012/09/03/ct_is_hell- 
yes_on_medicaid/>.  
	 64 
 
 
Cantor, Joel C. “Preventing Adverse Risk Selection in New Jersey’s Health Insurance  
Exchange and the Outside Individual and Small-Group Markets.” Rutgers Center  
for State Health Policy. Aug. 2012. Web. 10 Apr. 2014  
<http://www.cshp.rutgers.edu/Downloads/9510.pdf>. 
 
Carbone, John. Personal Interview. 19 Mar. 2014. 
 
“Connecticut Health Insurance Exchange: Board Membership.” Connecticut Health  
Reform Central. 24 Apr. 2012. Web. 4 Jan. 2014.  
<http://www.healthreform.ct.gov/ohri/cwp/view.asp?a=2742&q=333948>. 
 
“Connecticut Medicaid Expansion Outreach Report and Recommendations.” Connecticut  
Health Policy Project. Dec. 2012. Web. 4 Jan. 2014.  
<http://www.cthealthpolicy.org/pdfs/201212_medicaid_outreach.pdf>. 
 
“Connecticut: Uninsured Profile.” Access Health CT. 2013. Web. 20 Mar. 2014.  
<http://www.ct.gov/hix/lib/hix/Exhibit_E.1_CT-Uninsured-County-Zip-Profile- 
Summary.pdf>. 
 
“Debunking the Latest ACA Myth.” Universal Heath Care Foundation of CT. 4 Feb.  
2014. Web. 4 Apr. 2014. <http://hub.universalhealthct.org/2014/02/04/debunking- 
the-latest-aca-myth>. 
 
“Eastern AHEC, Inc. Named Official Navigator for Access Health CT.”  Eastern Area  
Health Education Center Inc. 2012. 20 Mar. 2014.  
<http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:0YFpIgJL_OIJ:www.ea 
sternctahec.org/news/article/eastern-ahec-inc-named-official-navigator-for- 
access-health-ct+&cd=2&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us>. 
 
“Exchange leaders deserve praise, but plenty of work remains.” Hartford Business  
Journal. 7 Apr. 2014. Web. 10 Apr. 2014.  
<http://www.hartfordbusiness.com/article/20140407/PRINTEDITION/30403992 
3/exchange-leaders-deserve-praise-but-plenty-of-work-remains>. 
 
“Federal Health Reform: State Implementation Entities, Reports, and Research.” National  
Conference of State Legislatures. Aug. 2013. Web. 4 Jan. 2014.  
<http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/state-implementation-entities-to-implement- 
the-aca.aspx>. 
	 65 
 
“Functions of the Federally Facilitated Exchange in Maine.” State of Maine Department  
of Professional and Financial Regulation. 18 Mar. 2013. Web. 4 Jan. 2014.  
<http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Technical-Implementation- 
Letters/Downloads/me-exchange-letter-03-18-2013.pdf>. 
 
Gallo, Carmine. “How The Apple Store Model Is Being Used To Explain Obamacare.”  
Forbes. 6 Sep. 2013. Web. 4 Apr. 2014.  
<http://www.forbes.com/sites/carminegallo/2013/09/06/how-the-apple-store- 
model-is-being-used-to-explain-obamacare>. 
 
Galvin, Kevin. Personal Interview. 26 Mar. 2014. 
 
Gruber, Jonathan, and Kenneth A. Couch, ed. “Massachusetts Points the Way to  
Successful Health Care Reform.” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management.  
2011. Web. 4 Apr. 2014.  
<http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/store/10.1002/pam.20551/asset/20551_ftp.pdf?v=1&t=hu
m8o0fq&s=4a4c79783d1a5724436b671fecbde50d5f341c9e>. 
 
“H.R. 3590 -- 111th Congress: Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.” www.GovTrack.us.  
2009. April 30, 2014 <http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/111/hr3590>. 
 
Haigh, Susan. “Nonprofit insurers struggle with health overhaul.” West Hawaii Today. 3  
Apr. 2014. Web. 3 Apr. 2014. <http://westhawaiitoday.com/news/nation-world- 
news/nonprofit-insurers-struggle-health-overhaul>. 
 
“Health Care Cabinet September 12, 2011 Meeting.” Connecticut Health Reform Central.  
12 Sep. 2011. Web. 4 Jan. 2014.  
<http://www.healthreform.ct.gov/ohri/cwp/view.asp?a=2742&q=333574>. 
 
“Health Insurance Exchanges Under the Affordable Care Act: Governance Options and  
Issues.” National Association of Insurance Commissioners. 2011. Web. 4 Jan.  
2014. <http://www.naic.org/store/free/HIE-OP.pdf>. 
 
Health Plan Benefits and Qualification Advisory Committee. “Plan Management  
Overview Memo.” Connecticut Health Insurance Exchange. 12 Dec. 2013. Web.  
4 Jan. 2014. <http://www.ct.gov/hix/cwp/view.asp?a=4299&Q=506202>. 
 
“Health System Innovation that Serves Consumers.” Universal Health Care Foundation  
of Connecticut. 11 Dec. 2013. Web. 10 Apr. 2014.  
	 66 
<http://hub.universalhealthct.org/2013/12/11/health-system-innovation-that- 
serves-consumers/> 
 
Hickens, Michael. “The Morning Download: Connecticut Health Exchange Offers States  
Urgent Care.” The Wall Street Journal. 1 Apr. 2014. Web. 4 Apr. 2014.  
<http://blogs.wsj.com/cio/2014/04/01/the-morning-download-connecticut-health- 
exchange-offers-states-urgent-care>. 
 
Holahan, John, and Linda Blumberg. "Massachusetts health care reform: a look at the  
issues." Health Affairs. 14 Sep. 2006. Web. 4 Jan. 2014. 
<http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/25/6/w432.abstract>. 
 
Holtz-Eakin, Douglas, and Kenneth A. Couch, ed. “Does Massachusetts’s Health Care  
Reform Point to Success With National Reform.” Journal of Policy Analysis and  
Management. 2011. Web. 4 Apr. 2014.  
<http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/store/10.1002/pam.20551/asset/20551_ftp.pdf?v=1&t=hu
m8o0fq&s=4a4c79783d1a5724436b671fecbde50d5f341c9e>. 
 
John, Arit. “The Best and Worst of Obamacare’s State-Run Exchanges.” The Wire. 22  
Jan. 2014. Web. 4 Apr. 2014. <http://www.thewire.com/politics/2014/01/best- 
and-worst-obamacares-state-run-exchanges/357265/>. 
 
Jost, Timothy S. “Health Insurance Exchanges and the Affordable Care Act: Key Policy  
Issues.” The Commonwealth Fund. Jul. 2010. Web. 4 Jan. 2014.  
<http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/Files/Publications/Fund%20Report 
/2010/Jul/1426_Jost_hlt_insurance_exchanges_ACA.pdf>. 
 
“Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured.” The Henry J. Kaiser Family  
Foundation. Web. 4 Jan. 2014. <http://kff.org/about-kaiser-commission-on-medicaid-
and-the-uninsured>. 
 
Kingsdale, Jon. "Implementing health care reform in Massachusetts: strategic lessons  
learned." Health Affairs 28.4. 28 May 2009. Web. 4 Jan 2014. 
<http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/28/4/w588.abstract>. 
Lash, Alta. Personal Interview. 10 Mar. 2014. 
 
Levin Becker, Arielle. Personal Interview. 1 Mar. 2014. 
 
Levin Becker, Arielle. “Proposal to let nurse practictioners practice independently  
advances.” CT Mirror. 10 Mar. 2014. Web. 11 Mar. 2014.  
	 67 
<http://ctmirror.org/proposal-to-let-nurse-practitioners-practice-independently- 
advances>. 
 
Levitt, Larry, Gary Claxton, and Anthony Damico. “Numbers Behind ‘Young  
Invincibles’ and the Affordable Care Act.” The Henry J. Kaiser Family  
Foundation. 17 Dec. 2013. Web. 4 Apr. 2014. <http://kff.org/health- 
reform/perspective/the-numbers-behind-young-invincibles-and-the-affordable- 
care-act/>. 
 
Lischko, Amy M., Sara S. Bachman, and Alyssa Vangeli. “The Massachusetts  
Commonwealth Health Insurance Connector: Structure and Functions.” The  
Commonwealth Fund. May 2009. Web. 4 Jan. 2014.  
<http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/Files/Publications/Issue%20Brief/2 
009/May/Issue%20Brief.pdf>. 
 
Long, Sharon K. “On the Road to Universal Coverage: Impacts of Reform in  
Massachusetts At One Year.” Health Affairs. 3 Jun. 2008. Web. 4 Jan. 2014.  
<http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/27/4/w270.full.pdf>. 
 
Long, Sharon K., and Paul B. Masi. "Access and affordability: an update on health  
reform in Massachusetts, fall 2008." Health Affairs 28.4. 28 May 2009. Web. 4  
Jan. 2014. <http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/28/4/w578.full.pdf>. 
 
Majone, G. and A. Wildavsky. “Implementation as Evolution.” Sage Publications, Inc.  
1978.  
 
Malloy, Dannel P. “Declaration Letter to Kathleen G. Sebelius.” The Center for  
Consumer Information & Insurance Oversight. 10 Jul. 2012. Web. 3 Jan. 2014.  
<http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Technical-Implementation- 
Letters/Downloads/ct-exchange-letter.pdf>. 
 
“Massachusetts Health Care Reform: Six Years Later.” The Henry J. Kaiser Family  
Foundation. 1 May 2012. Web. 4 Jan. 2014. 
<http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/8311.pdf >. 
 
Maxwell, James, Dharma E. Cortés, Karen L. Schneider, Anna Graves, and Brian  
Rosman. “Massachusetts’ Health Care Reform Increased Access to Care for  
Hispanics, But Disparities Remain.” Health Affairs. 2011. Web. 4 Jan. 2014. 
<http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/30/8/1451.abstract>. 
 
	 68 
McCambridge, Ruth. “Nonprofit Status of Hawaii’s Health Exchange Board Raises  
Concerns.” Nonprofit Quarterly. 10 Apr. 2012. Web. 4 Apr. 2014.  
<https://nonprofitquarterly.org/governancevoice/20118-nonprofit-status-of- 
hawaiis-health-exchange-board-raises-concerns.html>. 
 
McDonough, John E., Brian Rosman, Mehreen Butt, Lindsey Tucker, and Lisa Kaplan  
Howe. “Massachusetts Health Reform Implementation: Major Progress and  
Future Challenges.” Health Affairs. 2008. Web. 4 Jan. 2014.  
<http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/27/4/w285.full>. 
 
McLaughlin, Milbrey Wallin. “Learning From Experience: Lessons from Policy  
Implementation.” American Educational Research Association. 1987. Web. 4  
Apr. 2014. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1163728>. 
 
McQuaid, Hugh. “Wyman: SustiNet Is Still Dead.” CT News Junkie. 12 Sep. 2011. Web.  
4 Apr. 2014. 
<http://www.ctnewsjunkie.com/archives/entry/wyman_sustinet_is_still_dead/>. 
 
O'Toole Jr, Laurence J., and Robert S. Montjoy. "Interorganizational policy  
implementation: A theoretical perspective." Public Administration Review. 1984.  
Web. 4 Apr. 2014. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3110411>. 
 
Orentlicher, David. “Cost Containment and the Patient Protection and Affordable Care  
Act.” Florida International University Law Review. 30 Sep. 2011. Web. 4 Jan.  
2014. <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1936138>. 
 
Ornstein, Charles. “Epic Fail: Where Four State Health Exchanges Went Wrong.”  
Propublica. 6 Feb. 2014. Web. 4 Apr. 2014.  
<http://www.propublica.org/article/epic-fail-where-four-state-health-exchanges- 
went-wrong>. 
 
Pandey, Erica. “Connecticut becomes model for health care.” Yale Daily News. 27 Feb.  
2014. Web. 4 Apr. 2014. <http://yaledailynews.com/blog/2014/02/27/connecticut- 
becomes-model-for-health-care/>. 
 
Radelat, Ana. “Ct’s Latinos face hurdles in enrolling in Obamacare” The CT Mirror. 24  
Mar. 2014. Web. 4 Apr. 2014. <http://ctmirror.org/cts-latinos-face-hurdles-in- 
enrolling-in-obamacare/>. 
 
Raymond, Alan G.  “Lessons from the Implementation of Massachusetts Health Reform.”  
	 69 
Blue Cross Shield of Massachusetts Foundation. Mar. 2011. Web. 4 Jan. 2014. 
<http://bluecrossmafoundation.org/publication/lessons-implementation-massachusetts-
health-reform>. 
 
“Rick Perry Announces Texas Won’t Implement The Affordable Care Act, Leaving  
Millions of Texans Uninsured.” ThinkProgress. 9 Jul. 2012. Web. 4 Apr. 2014.  
<http://thinkprogress.org/health/2012/07/09/512671/texas-wont-implement- 
obamacare/>. 
 
SB921, An Act Establishing a State Health Insurance Exchange. Approved July 1, 2011.  
<http://www.cga.ct.gov/2011/act/pa/2011PA-00053-R00SB-00921-PA.htm> 
 
Scotti, Christina. “Why State-Run Exchanges are Faring Better.” FOX Business. 16 Oct.  
2013. Web. 4 Jan. 2014. <http://www.foxbusiness.com/personal- 
finance/2013/10/16/why-state-run-health-exchanges-are-faring-better>. 
 
Sebelius, Kathleen. “Conditional Approval Letter to Dannel P. Malloy.” The Center for  
Consumer Information & Insurance Oversight. 7 Dec. 2012. Web. 3 Jan. 2014.  
<http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Files/Downloads/ct-blueprint-exchange- 
letter-12-07-2012.pdf> 
 
Speights, Keith. “5 States with the Most Abominable Obamacare Enrollment Numbers.” The  
Motley Fool. 16 Feb. 2014. Web. 4 Jan. 2014.  
<http://www.fool.com/investing/general/2014/02/16/5-states-with-the-most-abominable- 
obamacare-enroll.aspx>. 
 
“State Actions to Address Health Insurance Exchanges.” National Conference of State  
Legislatures. 24 Apr. 2014. Web. 24 Apr. 2014.  
<http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/state-actions-to-implement-the-health- 
benefit.aspx> 
 
“State Decisions For Creating Health Insurance Marketplaces.” The Henry J. Kaiser Family  
Foundation. 28 May 2013. Web. 4 Jan. 2014. <http://kff.org/health-reform/state- 
indicator/health-insurance-exchanges/>. 
 
“State Health Insurance Marketplaces.” The Center for Consumer Information &  
Insurance Oversight. 1 Oct. 2013. Web. 3 Jan. 2014.  
<http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Fact-Sheets-and-FAQs/state- 
marketplaces.html>. 
 
	 70 
“State Marketplace Profiles: Connecticut.” The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation. 27  
Sep. 2013. Web. 4 Apr. 2014. <http://kff.org/health-reform/state-profile/state-e 
xchange-profiles-connecticut>. 
 
“State Marketplace Profiles: New York.” The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation. 30  
Sep. 2013. Web. 4 Apr. 2014. <http://kff.org/health-reform/state-profile/state- 
exchange-profiles-new-york>. 
 
Stewartson, Karen. “Connecticut Lieutenant Governor Discusses State’s Health Benefit  
Exchange.” Government Technology. 27 Oct. 2011. Web. 4 Jan. 2014.  
<http://www.govtech.com/health/Connecticut-Lieutenant-Governor-Discusses- 
States-Health-Benefit-Exchange.htm>. 
 
Stuart, Christine. “SustiNet Board Releases Report.” CT News Junkie. 27 May 2010.  
Web. 4 Jan. 2014. 
<http://www.ctnewsjunkie.com/archives/entry/sustinet_board_releases_report>. 
 
SustiNet Health Partnership. “Report to the Connecticut General Assembly From the  
SustiNet Health Partnership Board of Directors.” Jan. 2011. Web. 4 Jan. 2014.  
<http://www.ct.gov/sustinet/lib/sustinet/sn.final_report.appendix.cga.010711.pdf> 
 
“The Role of Nurse Practitioners in Meeting Increasing Demand for Primary Care.”  
National Governors Association. 2012. Web. 4 Jan. 2014.  
<https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1016169-national-governors- 
association-paper-on-nurse.html>. 
 
Thompson, Frank J. "New federalism and health care policy: States and the old  
questions." Journal of health politics, policy and law 11.4. 1986. 
 
Van Loon, Peter. Personal Interview. 28 Feb. 2014. 
 
Vestal, Christine. “After Expanding Coverage, Massachusetts Focuses on Taming Costs.”  
Kaiser Health News. 9 Apr. 2013. Web. 4 Jan. 2014.  
<http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Stories/2013/April/09/massachusetts-health- 
care-costs.aspx?p=1>. 
 
“Where the Rubber Meets the Road: Strategies for Successful State Implementation of  
the Affordable Care Act.” The California Endowment. Jan. 2011. Web. 4 Jan. 2014. 
<http://www.communitycatalyst.org/doc-
store/publications/Rubber_Meets_Road_Jan_2011.pdf>. 
	 71 
 
Whipple, Scott. “Access Health CT has ‘overall 98 percent satisfaction.’” New Britain  
Herald. 12 Apr. 2014. Web. 14 Apr. 2014.  
<http://www.newbritainherald.com/articles/2014/04/12/news/doc5349e894eea4c8 
62615236.txt>. 
 
Wyman, Nancy. “Members of the Connecticut Health Insurance Exchange Announced.”  
25 Aug. 2011. Web. 4 Jan. 2014.  
<http://www.ltgovernor.ct.gov/wyman/cwp/view.asp?Q=485090&A=4029>. 
 
Zhu, Jane, Phyllis Brawarsky, Stuart Lipsitz, Haiden Huskamp, and Jennifer S. Haas.  
"Massachusetts health reform and disparities in coverage, access and health  
status." Journal of General Internal Medicine. 21 Aug. 2010. Web. 4 Jan. 2014.  
<http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11606-010-1482-y/fulltext.html>. 
